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Irrational Ignorance at the Patent
Office
Michael D. Frakes*
Melissa F. Wasserman**
There is widespread belief that the Patent Office issues too many
“bad” patents that impose significant harms on society. At first glance,
the solution to the patent quality crisis seems straightforward: give
patent examiners more time to review applications so that they grant
patents only to those inventions that deserve them. Yet the answer to the
harms of invalid patents may not be that easy. It is possible that the
Patent Office is, as Mark Lemley famously wrote, “rationally ignorant.”
In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Lemley argued that because
so few patents are economically significant, it makes sense to rely on
litigation to make detailed validity determinations in those rare cases
rather than increase the expenses associated with conducting a more
thorough review of all patent applications. He supported his thesis with
a cost-benefit calculation in which he concluded that the costs of giving
examiners more time outweigh the benefits of doing so.
Given the import of the “rational ignorance” concept to the debate
on how best to address bad patents, the time is ripe to revisit this
discussion. This Article seeks to conduct a similar cost-benefit analysis
to the one that Lemley attempted nearly fifteen years ago. In doing so,
we employ new and rich sources of data along with sophisticated
empirical techniques to form novel, empirically driven estimates of the
relationships that Lemley was forced to assume in his own analysis
given the dearth of empirical evidence at the time. Armed with these new
estimates, this Article demonstrates that the savings in future litigation
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and prosecution expenses associated with giving examiners additional
time per application more than outweigh the costs of increasing
examiner time allocations. Thus, we conclude the opposite of Lemley:
society would be better off investing more resources in the Patent Office
to improve patent quality than relying on ex post litigation to weed out
invalid patents. Given its current level of resources, the Patent Office is
not being “rationally ignorant” but, instead, irrationally ignorant.
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INTRODUCTION
The principal task of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(“Patent Office” or “Agency”) is to determine whether an invention
merits a reward of a patent.1 There is growing consensus that the
Patent Office is failing at this task.2 Many believe that the Agency
allows too many “bad” patents that unnecessarily drain consumer
welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract rents
from innovators.3 The Patent Office’s overgranting tendencies have

1.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
FISCAL YEAR 2017, at tbl.3 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
USPTOFY17PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEQ7-9G2P] (noting the Patent Office’s mission includes
“[f]ostering innovation . . . and . . . delivering high quality and timely examination of
patent . . . applications”). We use the term “patent” in this Article to refer to utility patents. Utility
patents protect the way an article is used and works. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”).
2.
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (noting several ways in which the
issuing of patents may harm innovation and industry); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 7 (2004) (“We wrote this book because patent policy in the
United States has gotten seriously off the rails, in ways that endanger the long-term well-being of
our citizens.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–7 (2003), http:///www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JBV-7GCW] (“Both competition and patent policy can foster
innovation, but each requires a proper balance with the other to do so. Errors or systematic biases
in how one policy’s rules are interpreted and applied can harm the other policy’s effectiveness.”).
3.
See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 71, 87–88 (2013) (“Among patent scholars, there is almost unanimous agreement that patent
examiners do not do their job particularly well, with the PTO issuing many invalid patents.”);
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001)
(“The PTO has come under attack of late for failing to do a serious job of examining patents, thus
allowing bad patents to slip through the system.”); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the
Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 181 (2008) (“A growing chorus of voices is
sounding a common refrain: the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is issuing far too many
bad patents.”); Dough Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) (“Calls for patent reform have echoed loudly over the
past several years, with industry organizations, patent scholars, and government agencies all
publicly announcing that the patent system is broken and that the PTO in particular is letting a
large number of undeserving patents be issued.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589–91 (1999) (“The concerns about quality, especially in light of the
data on overall volume, point to one conclusion: the patent system is in crisis. “); John R. Thomas,
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 305, 316–22 (“The patent quality crisis is worthy of our attention. The market impact of
business method patents alone has yet to be quantitatively assessed, but decisions such as
Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com suggest staggering possibilities.”); R. Polk Wagner,
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2139–45 (2009) (“The patentprosecution process is fraught with serious information problems of the sort that a robust
marketplace might be able to resolve at least as well as an over-taxed administrative agency.”).
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been the subject of multiple reports by the National Academies and the
Federal Trade Commission.4 Patent quality concerns have energized
the Supreme Court into taking a renewed interest in substantive patent
law5 and driven Congress in 2011 to enact the first major patent reform
act in nearly sixty years.6
Although there is widespread agreement that invalid patents
impose significant costs on society, there is little consensus as to how
best to fix the patent system.7 At first glance, the solution seems
straightforward: the Patent Office needs to do more to ensure it awards
patents only to those inventions that deserve them. A seemingly
promising start—and one that is at the forefront of current policy
discussions8—is to give patent examiners more time to evaluate
applications. On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only eighteen
hours reviewing an application,9 which includes reading the
application, searching for prior art, comparing the prior art with the
application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent applicant’s
arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant’s
attorney.10 If examiners are not given enough time to evaluate
applications, they may not be able to reject applications by identifying
and articulating justifications with appropriate underlying legal
validity. Offering validation for these concerns, recent reports
commissioned by the federal government bemoan that examiners

4.
See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen
A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (discussing several issues with the patenting process); NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza
eds., 2006) (recommending a higher standard for biotechnology patent qualification); see also FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2 (noting concerns for poor patent quality, legal standards, and
procedures).
5.
Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3, at 185 (“The unprecedented modern Supreme Court
interest in patent cases and congressional interest in patent reform are both driven in part by the
widespread perception that the PTO is acting as a rubber stamp, regularly issuing bad patents
that wind up imposing costs on others.”).
6.
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38, 40 (2011).
7.
See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 618–21 (2015) (summarizing the
various explanations for the Patent Office’s perceived overgranting tendencies).
8.
See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
9.
Online
Appendix
tbl.A2.
The
Online
Appendix
is
available
at
https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2019/04/online-appendix-to-irrational-ignorance-atthe-patent-office [https://perma.cc/D363-BPAJ].
10. Because patent applications are presumed valid, if examiners are not able to conduct a
sufficient search of prior art and articulate a proper basis of rejection over these hours, they are
legally expected to allow the application. See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability,
97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995–96 (2013) (“An applicant enjoys a presumption of patentability, which
means that at the time of filing the application is rebuttably presumed to comply with the utility,
novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements of the patent statute.”).
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believe they are “fighting for their lives” and are “not [given] enough
time to do a proper job.”11 Providing more systematic support, our prior
empirical work tested the extent to which patent examiner time
allocations are causing examiners to grant invalid patents and found
that examiners were indeed granting patents of dubious quality
because they are not given sufficient time to review patent
applications.12
Even in the face of this evidence, however, it is not immediately
clear that the solution to the patent quality crisis is to give patent
examiners more time. While increasing examiner time allocations will
decrease the number of invalid patents issued by the Patent Office, it is
possible that the Patent Office is, as Mark Lemley famously wrote,
“rationally ignorant.”13 That is, it may be rational for the Patent Office
not to screen patent applications too rigorously because there is another
institutional player that could weed out bad patents: the courts.
Mark Lemley’s seminal article on “rational ignorance” confronts
a classic regulatory dilemma: Should society rely on an ex ante,
administrative approach to substantive regulation—at a lower cost per
unit but at a higher volume of activity—or should society instead
regulate ex post via a litigation system—at a higher cost per unit but at
a lower level of activity?14 In the case of patent validity determinations,
Lemley favored the latter. He argued that because so few patents are
litigated or licensed, it is better to rely on litigation to make detailed
validity determinations in those rare instances rather than increasing
the resources to the Patent Office to provide more thorough review of
all patent applications.15 Lemley supported his thesis with a cost-

11. MANHATTAN STRATEGY GRP., PATENT EXAMINERS PRODUCTION EXPECTANCY GOALS REASSESSMENT AND ADJUSTMENT STUDY, at D-9 (2010) (on file with author) (quoting patent
examiners participating in a focus group).
12. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 560 (2017), online appendix available at
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00605/suppl_file/REST_a_00605esupp.pdf [https://perma.cc/R52Y-XKQV] (“Our analysis suggests that as time constraints tighten,
examiners will grant some patents that they might have otherwise rejected if given sufficient
time.”).
13. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1531 (“The PTO is rationally ignorant of the objective validity of
the patents it examines.”).
14. For a discussion of this regulatory dilemma in other contexts, see, for example, Iman
Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of
Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013); Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2015); and John D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998).
15. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1497 (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a
competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few
cases than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”).
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benefit analysis wherein he concluded that the costs associated with
doubling the Patent Office’s hours to review patent applications
outweighed the benefits gained by the resulting decrease in the number
of invalid patents the Patent Office would issue.16 Although some of the
numbers in his analysis reflect hard data, the dearth of empirical
evidence available at the time forced him to make several critical
assumptions, including assuming (rather than estimating) how many
fewer patents the Patent Office would issue if examiner time allocations
were doubled.17
While it has been over fifteen years since Lemley wrote his
important and widely cited article, the debate on how to best rid
ourselves of bad patents continues to rage on. In 2011, Congress enacted
the most comprehensive reform bill to the patent system in decades and
arguably favored the ex post approach by creating a new adjudicatory
tribunal at the Patent Office, wherein third parties can challenge the
validity of issued patents.18 In 2016, for the first time in forty years, the
Patent Office began a comprehensive reevaluation of examiner time
allocations, arguably favoring an ex ante approach.19
The time is ripe to revisit whether the Patent Office is, in fact,
“rationally ignorant.” Should we increase the resources at the Patent
Office in an effort to increase the quality of issued patents, or should we
forego those marginal investments and reserve a larger residual role for
the courts? This Article begins to answer this question by employing
new and rich sources of data along with sophisticated empirical
techniques to form novel, empirically driven estimates of the
relationships that Lemley was forced to guess in his own analysis.
Armed with these new estimates, this Article demonstrates that
the savings in future litigation costs and prosecution expenses20
associated with giving examiners additional time per application
outweigh the costs of increasing examiner time allocations. The
efficiency gains from marginal investments at the Patent Office are

16. Id. at 1508–10.
17. Id. at 1509.
18. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313
(2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 321–29 (2012)) (post-grant review
proceedings); id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012))
(providing for a transitional program for covered business method patents); id. § 10, 125 Stat. at
316–20 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)) (providing for fee-setting authority); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011) (noting that the primary purpose of the America
Invents Act is to “improve patent quality”).
19. Request for Comments on Examination Time Goals, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,383 (Oct. 25, 2016).
Patent examiner time allocations have not been substantially modified since 1976.
20. Prosecution expenses are the costs related to interactions between the patent applicant
and the Patent Office.
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even greater when considering a range of additional harms that may
ensue from the issuance of invalid patents by the Agency. We thus
conclude the opposite of Lemley: society would be better off investing
more resources into the Agency to improve patent quality than relying
on ex post litigation to weed out invalid patents. Given its current level
of resources, the Patent Office is not being “rationally ignorant” but,
instead, irrationally ignorant.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a summary of
our prior empirical work, which found that examiner time allocations
were causing examiners to grant invalid patents. This Part concludes
by briefly summarizing Lemley’s seminal article, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, highlighting its import in the debate of what to do
about bad patents and noting three key assumptions he made in his
cost-benefit analysis. Part II comprehensively sets forth the various
social benefits associated with increasing the time examiners spend
evaluating patent applications, and Part III comprehensively sets forth
the various social costs associated with augmenting the time examiners
have to review patent applications. In doing so, Parts II and III draw
on empirical analyses to provide novel, rigorous estimates of the key
relationships comprising this cost-benefit exercise. Part IV then
compares the empirical estimates of the costs and savings associated
with augmenting examiner time allocations to conclude that the Patent
Office is—at least under its current resources—irrationally ignorant.
Part IV also highlights the key differences between our findings and
Lemley’s. We address possible objections in Part V. Finally, Part VI
provides some specifics as to how the Patent Office should increase
examiner time allocations.
I. BACKGROUND
This Article seeks to provide a take on the classic regulatory
question: Should society increase the resources of the Patent Office to
weed out bad patents, or should society instead reserve a larger residual
role for the courts to invalidate improvidently granted patents? Our
approach to this question is to evaluate the merits of increasing the
Agency’s resources through a particular policy tool: augmenting the
amount of time that patent examiners are given to review applications.
Section I.A summarizes our prior findings that examiner time
allocations induce examiners to grant patents of dubious quality.
Section I.B summarizes Lemley’s seminal article, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, highlighting its import in the debate over what to do
about bad patents as well as noting three critical assumptions he made
in his cost-benefit analysis.
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A. Increasing Time Allocations
Why would extending examiners more time to review
applications result in the Patent Office issuing fewer legally invalid
patents? Patent applications are legally presumed to comply with the
statutory patentability requirements when filed. As a result, a patent
examiner that is not able to conduct a sufficient search of prior art and
articulate a proper basis of rejection during their allotted review time
is legally expected to allow the application.21 Thus, examiners who do
not have enough time to properly evaluate applications are likely to
grant invalid patents.
Scholars and commentators have long believed that examiners
are not given sufficient time to conduct a thorough and comprehensive
analysis, though they had generally provided little evidence to support
this assertion.22 To fill this gap, our prior research sought to move
beyond anecdotal sentiments and empirically test the extent to which
patent examiners’ time allocations cause them to grant invalid
patents.23
The Patent Office sets a patent examiner’s time allocation based
on two key factors: the technological field in which the examiner is
working and her position in the general schedule (“GS”) pay scale.24 A
patent examiner in a more complex field is provided more hours to
review an application than an examiner of the same GS-level who is
working in a less complex field.25 The higher the pay grade of an
examiner within a technology area, the fewer hours the Patent Office
extends to that examiner.26 To demonstrate the degree to which time
allocations scale with GS-level changes, we present in Table 1 the
examination time expectations facing a patent examiner working in one
of the most complex fields, artificial intelligence, and one of the least

21. Seymore, supra note 10, at 995–96.
22. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 550 (summarizing anecdotal evidence that patent
examiners are time-crunched).
23. Id.
24. U.S. DEP’T COMM., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USPTO SHOULD REASSESS HOW
EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD SYSTEM STIMULATE
AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION 7 n.6 (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/109legis/CommerceDept_IGReportonPTO.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G94G-62T4] (“Expectancy goals vary among examiners and are based on the
individual examiner’s grade level and the complexity of the technology under review.”).
25. Andy Faile, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Operations, Examination Time and the Production
System, Presentation at the Santa Clara-Duke Quality Conference (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://1x937u16qcra1vnejt2hj4jl-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/FaileExamination-Time-and-the-Production-System.pptx [https://perma.cc/4S3N-GKDB].
26. Id.
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complex fields, compound tools (e.g., a hammer).27 A promotion to each
subsequent pay grade is roughly equated to a 10% to 15% decrease in
the number of allocated examination hours.28 Examiners operating at
GS-level 7 are given the greatest amount of time in reviewing patents
in compound tools and artificial intelligence—19.7 hours and 45.1
hours, respectively—whereas examiners operating at GS-level 14 are
expected to review the same patent in approximately half that time.
In our recent research, we embraced the variation made possible
by these schedules to test the link between examination time and the
granting practices of examiners. More specifically, we followed
individual examiners throughout the course of their careers and
tracked the evolution of their examination behavior as they experienced
GS-level promotions that diminished the amount of examination time
at their disposal.29 Our methodological design was structured so as to
explore this relationship between grant rates and the occurrence of
time-allocation-reducing promotions while accounting for the
potentially confounding influence of other factors—e.g., increases in
examiner years of experience—that may be correlated with such
promotions and that may independently affect examiner granting
tendencies. Accordingly, in estimating this relationship between GSlevels and grant rates, our underlying regression specifications
included a series of fixed effects and other controls: (1) year fixed effects,
based on the year in which the application is disposed of, to account for
general Patent Office trends and granting practices; (2) examiner
experience fixed effects (in two-year bins), to better isolate the timeallocation aspect of GS-level promotions and account for the correlation
between GS-levels and experience; (3) examiner fixed effects, to account
for the possibility, among other things, that higher GS-level examiners
have fundamentally different granting styles from their more junior
counterparts; (4) technology-by-year fixed effects, to alleviate concerns
that examiners may be reassigned to different technologies as they
ascend to higher pay grades and that such reallocation schemes may
change over time; and (5) various individual characteristics of the
applications, including the entity size of the applicant (large versus
small), the length of time between the filing and the disposition of the
application, and the foreign priority status of the application (previous
filings at the European Patent Office (“EPO”) and Japanese Patent
Office (“JPO”). Our recent research also included various additional

27. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, HOW THE USPTO DETERMINES PRODUCTION FOR
USPTO PATENT EXAMINERS (on file with author).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 550.
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empirical exercises to support the proposition that our methodological
design captured variations in time allocations—e.g., we tested for and
found stronger relationships in the case of time-sensitive bases of
rejecting patent applications.30
To execute our empirical strategy, we utilized novel data on 1.4
million patent applications disposed of between 2002 and 2012, merged
with rich, examiner roster data received from the Patent Office
pursuant to a series of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests.
We found that as an examiner is given less time to review an
application—as identified by these time-reducing promotions—the less
active she becomes in searching for prior art, the less likely she becomes
to make time-intensive rejections, and the more likely she becomes to
grant the patent.31 The magnitude of the result is quite striking. A
patent examiner who has been promoted to GS-level 14 has a grant rate
that is 13% to 29% higher than it was when she was at a GS-level 7.32
TABLE 1: EXAMINATION HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINER AS A
FUNCTION OF GS-LEVEL33
(1)

(2)

Compound Tools
19.7

Artificial
Intelligence
45.1

GS-9
GS-11

17.3
15.3

39.5
35.1

GS-12

13.8

31.6

GS-13

12.0

27.5

GS-13, partial signatory
GS-14

11.0
10.2

25.3
23.4

GS-level
GS-7

In the Online Appendix, we update the analysis from this prior
work to include five additional years of application data.34 We find
nearly identical results. In the preferred empirical specification that we
present, we find a roughly 27% (or 19 percentage-point) higher grant
rate for an examiner at GS-level 14 relative to GS-level 7.35 Figure 1
uses these updated results to plot the relationship between a given

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at online app. at 2–3 tbl.A1.
See Online Appendix, supra note 9; see also Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12.
See infra Figure 1.
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examiner’s grant rate and the occurrence of each of the indicated GSlevel promotions, wherein GS-level 7 serves as the omitted reference
group and wherein the indicated relationships partial out the influence
of those other factors mentioned above (e.g., examiner experience-level
bins).36 As Figure 1 demonstrates, examiner grant rates ascend strongly
and monotonically with each GS-level promotion. In addition to the rich
level of controls that we include in the regression design underlying this
figure, the analysis also supports a causal interpretation of the observed
pattern in light of certain institutional features of the Patent Office.
Mainly because patent applications are randomly assigned to
examiners within their technological groups, there is no reason to
believe that examiners at higher GS-levels are being assigned more
patent-worthy applications than examiners at lower GS-levels.37
Our updated analysis implies that if examiners are given double
the amount of time to review applications, the Patent Office’s overall
grant rate would fall by roughly 19 percentage points, amounting to
roughly eighty thousand fewer patents issued per year. What is the
nature of these eighty thousand patents? Are they valid or invalid? If
we were to expand time allocations so as to knock out patents, we would
hope that the affected patents would indeed be invalid patents.
Fortunately, our previous study was able to explore the nature of those
patents issued on the margin as a result of binding time constraints. 38
To do so, we relied on the fact that many U.S. applicants likewise file
for patent protection with the EPO and the JPO, two offices that are
known to invest substantially more resources per application in the
examination process while having essentially similar patentability
standards.39 Accordingly, we considered the sample of issued patents in
which the relevant U.S. applicant likewise sought protection at the EPO
and the JPO and used outcomes at these foreign offices as a
benchmark—albeit an imperfect one—to assess what the outcome at
the U.S. Patent Office would have been (at least generally speaking) if
the U.S. examiners were given more time and resources to determine

36. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 556.
37. A recent paper by Cesare Righi and Timothy Simcoe documents evidence of examiner
specialization within technology-group assignments, as well as specialization within technology
subgroups. Cesare Righi & Timothy Simcoe, Patent Examiner Specialization, 48 RES. POL’Y 137,
141 (2019). However, Righi and Simcoe’s analysis finds “little evidence” suggesting that
applications are assigned to examiners based on the importance or claim breadth of the
applications or on their patent worthiness. Id. at 147.
38. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 553.
39. Pierre M. Picard & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Patent Office Governance and
Patent System Quality, 104 J. PUB. ECON. 14, 16–17 (2013) (presenting “stylized facts on
differences between the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office
(EPO), and the Japan Patent Office (JPO)”).
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the patentability of the relevant invention.40 We found evidence that
the promotions of interest in our study were associated with a reduction
in the frequency by which the inventors of U.S.-issued patents are
successful in securing patent protection for the relevant inventions at
the EPO and the JPO.41 The implication of this finding is that the
marginal patents being issued as a result of binding time constraints
are indeed of questionable legal validity.
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FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND GRANT
RATE
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Relative Grant Rate: Confidence Interval

Relative Grant Rate: Mean

This Figure presents results from a regression of the incidence of a granted
application on dummy variables representing each GS-level between 7 and 14. The
dummy variable for GS-level 7 is omitted, representing the reference group. The
vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients. The
underlying regression producing this relationship accounts for fixed differences in
granting practices across technology groups, across examiners, and across years,
while also controlling for examiner experience levels. Further specifics are provided
in the Online Appendix.42

40. To assess the quality of these marginal patent issuances, we consider the full sample of
patents that were issued in the United States and also sought protection in the EPO and the JPO
and then estimate how the mean incidence of such patents likewise being granted by the EPO
(and/or the JPO) changes as examiners experience GS-level promotions that reduce the amount of
examination time available to them. Consistent with expectations, we find that relative to the
patents issued at GS-level 7, the patents issued at GS-level 14 are seven percentage points (or
roughly sixteen percent) less likely to be allowed by both the EPO and the JPO (when using success
at both foreign offices to signify the strongest benchmark of quality). Frakes & Wasserman, supra
note 12, at 560.
41. Id.
42. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 2–4.
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In summary, our results from our prior research suggest that
examiners are facing binding time constraints and that these time
constraints are inducing examiners to grant invalid patents.43
B. The Rationally Ignorant Patent Office
Despite the existence of this compelling empirical evidence, it is
not immediately clear that the solution to the patent quality crisis is to
increase the time allocations of examiners. The Patent Office is not the
only institution in the patent system that is capable of removing bad
patents. Patent examiners, the adjudicatory board at the Patent Office,
and the federal courts are all tasked with applying the patentability
standards and assessing the validity of inventions seeking patent
protection. In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Mark Lemley
argued that it is rational for the Patent Office not to screen patent
applications too rigorously.44 The key to his argument is that most bad
patents are not economically significant because, like patents generally,
few bad patents are litigated or licensed.45 Armed with this insight, he
contended that litigation over a few economically valuable patents
ex post may be more cost effective than a thorough examination of all
patents ex ante.46 Despite the power of this conceptual observation, it
is ultimately an empirical question whether the ex ante approach is in
fact less cost effective than simply relying on the ex post litigation
alternative.
Lemley, recognizing this, attempted to support his “rational
ignorance” contention with a cost-benefit analysis. During this
calculation, he limited his consideration of costs and benefits to the
following: private costs of prosecuting patents, annual returns of
licensing patents, and total litigation costs.47 Lemley concluded that the
costs associated with doubling the Patent Office’s hours to review
patent applications outweigh the social benefits gained by the resulting
decrease in the number of invalid patents the Patent Office would
issue.48 Although some of the numbers in his analysis reflect hard data,
empirical evidence on a number of the relationships important to his
analysis was unavailable at that time. As a result, he was forced to

43. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 554–55.
44. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1496–97 (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a
competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few
cases than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1496.
47. Id. at 1508–10.
48. Id. at 1508.
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guess the magnitude of certain key parameters of this cost-benefit
analysis, including the following:49
• First, he assumed that doubling the time allocated to patent
examiners would result in a ten percent drop in the number
of invalidly issued patents.50
• Second, he assumed that a ten percent drop in the number of
improvidently issued patents would correspond with a 10%
drop in litigation costs.51
• Third, he assumed that doubling patent examiners’ time
allocations would result in a fifty percent increase in the
attorney’s cost of prosecuting a patent application.52
The influence of Lemley’s contention that the Patent Office is,
and ought to be, “rationally ignorant” is incontestable. Lemley is the
most frequently cited scholar in the field of intellectual property53 and
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office is his most cited article.54 Given
the influence of the “rational ignorance” concept, it is unsurprising that
we are not the first to revisit the idea. Perhaps most notably, Arti Rai
has argued that while there is much to admire about Lemley’s article,
it suffers from several limitations.55 Rai noted, as we do above, that
Lemley’s cost-benefit analysis is based on “a few empirical assertions”
and that he had to “assume” or “guess” critical relationships.56 She then
cogently argued that the cost-benefit analysis of whether the time
allocations of patent examiners should be increased should include a
fuller account of the costs associated with the persistence of invalid
patents—i.e., the benefits that would ensue from eliminating such
patents—than Lemley set forth in his article.57 Shuba Ghosh and Jay
49. Id. at 1511.
50. Id. at 1508.
51. Id. at 1509.
52. Id. at 1508.
53. Brian Leiter, Ten Most-Cited Law Faculty in the United States for the Period of 20132017, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (Aug. 14, 2018), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/
leiter/2018/08/ten-most-cited-law-faculty-in-the-united-states-for-the-period-2013-2017.html
[https://perma.cc/72AF-WCJS]. Mark Lemley is ranked fourth and also happens to be the only law
professor included on the list who writes in intellectual property, as well as the youngest law
professor included on the list. Id.
54. Mark Lemley, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=dF7HJ18
AAAAJ&hl=en (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AP9Z-82EJ] (noting that Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office has received over 1,200 citations).
55. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1081 (2003) (“Ultimately, however, the analysis suffers from
several limitations.”).
56. Id. at 1080–81.
57. Id. at 1081–84. Rai also provides an interesting discussion on how post-grant proceedings
could alter Lemley’s cost-benefit analysis. Given that Rai wrote her article in 2003, her discussion
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Kesan have made a similar argument, delineating in detail the various
costs of bad patents that Lemley did not include in his analysis.58 We
agree with this contention and discuss how a broader spectrum of costs
and benefits shapes and influences our analysis below. Notably, neither
Rai nor Ghosh and Kesan attempted their own calculations to
determine whether the social benefits of providing more resources to
the Patent Office outweigh the social costs of doing so, noting the
difficulties with such an endeavor.59
Because the resolution of this debate ultimately rests on an
empirical evaluation of the costs and benefits of investing more in
ex ante examination review, this Article, similar to Lemley’s, confronts
that cost-benefit exercise. Unlike Lemley, however, who had to guess
each of the three above-mentioned critical relationships, we are able to
provide empirically driven estimates of these relationships by utilizing
rigorous empirical methodologies drawn from our own prior work and
from that of others. Given the import of the “rational ignorance” concept
on the debate surrounding how to increase patent quality, it is
important to revisit the idea bringing to bear new empirical data and
novel empirical methods to the concept. In doing so, we hope to provide
a more accurate picture of the costs and benefits associated with
increasing the resources of the Patent Office to weed out bad patents.
The next Part begins this difficult task.
II. SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH DECREASING THE ISSUANCE OF INVALID
PATENTS
Should we increase the resources of the Patent Office to help
solve the patent quality crisis or rely on litigation to weed out bad
patents? To answer this question, we want to know whether spending
one dollar on increasing the resources at the Agency would save more
than one dollar on the back end. That is, are the marginal benefits
associated with allowing fewer invalid patents (due to the additional
of post-grant proceedings assumes a structure like the European model—i.e., a continuation of the
initial examination of patent application. This model, however, does not follow inter partes review
procedures, which are the dominant mode of PTAB adjudication.
58. Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance
in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (2004). Ghosh and Kesan also argued that
litigation would not perfectly eliminate all invalid patents. Id. at 1229. Ghosh and Kesan provide
numerous reasons why invalid patents that are imposing harm on society may never be challenged
in litigation. Id. at 1229–35. We see this argument as a corollary of their first point. To the extent
that invalid patents will never be challenged in litigation, it is important to more fully understand
the costs they impose on society.
59. Id. at 1228. Recognizing the difficulties associated with such a task and the lack of
empirical data, Gosh and Kesan found that “it is difficult to quantify meaningfully the magnitude
of the total social costs of bad patents.” Id.
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dollar spent on Agency resources) greater than the marginal costs of
providing examiners with more time to evaluate a patent application?
If the answer is yes, then more savings are recouped than spent, and
society should devote more resources to the Patent Office to increase
the quality of examinations. If the answer is no, then society should not
increase the resources to the Agency but instead continue to rely on
litigation at its current level to weed out bad patents.
To begin to tackle this calculation, the potential savings
associated with increasing resources to the Patent Office and the costs
associated with decreasing the number of invalid patents issued by the
Agency must be understood. Before laying out the structure of this
analysis, however, we note that while we desire to explore the returns
to an additional dollar of spending at the Agency, our analysis below
will actually evaluate the benefits arising from a larger marginal
investment at the Patent Office. In order to make a direct comparison
with Lemley, we will estimate the costs and benefits associated with a
doubling of the amount of hours given to examiners, an investment in
examination resources that surely exceeds one dollar. Nonetheless, we
do not believe that our conclusion hinges on whether we approach this
from the perspective of adding one more dollar to examination review
or whether we envision doubling the time allotted for examination
review. After all, in estimating the costs associated with doubling
examination time, we conservatively assume some degree of overhead
costs, hiring costs, and other costs associated with hiring and staffing
more examiners. We would arguably not need to assume as many
indirect costs of this nature if we just hypothesized adding a marginal
dollar to examination review. In this case, whatever conclusion we
reach as to the merits of more ex ante investment with a doubling-ofhours approach should only generalize if we instead assessed the merits
of a smaller, more marginal investment at the Patent Office. On the
savings side, we confront this scaling concern somewhat directly with
our empirical analysis. As discussed below, we find similar savings
estimates whether we estimate empirical specifications that impose a
linear relationship between time and litigation events or whether we
estimate specifications that take a more nonparametric approach that
does not assume any such linearity. Accordingly, when thinking about
the savings side of our analysis, we also find no reason to believe that
our results would not scale with the assumed size of the marginal
investment in the Agency.
This Part begins the cost-benefit calculation by sketching the
savings associated with increasing the time an examiner spends
reviewing a patent application. The potential savings from issuing
fewer invalid patents are numerous. The harms associated with bad
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patents include supracompetitive pricing (and the resulting reduction
in access to the patented inventions),60 the preclusion of competitors
from entering the affected markets,61 and the stunting of follow-on
innovation.62 Invalid patents can also be utilized to opportunistically
extract licensing fees from innovators,63 inhibit the ability of startups
to obtain venture capital,64 impose wasteful litigation costs on society,
and needlessly tax our already overburdened judiciary.65
Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to quantify the vast majority of
these harms with any certainty.
As a result, this Part focuses on the potential savings associated
with litigation savings, the benefit for which the most empirical data is
available. It then considers whether doubling the time allocations of
examiners results in decreasing prosecution expenses and concludes by
considering other potential savings associated with doubling patent
examiner time allocations.
A. Litigation Savings
This Section begins by outlining the litigation savings associated
with doubling the time given to patent examiners to review
applications. Determining the potential benefits associated with
increasing Patent Office resources requires knowledge of the following
60. Not surprisingly, the patentability standards reflect a careful balance between
encouraging innovation and drains on consumer welfare. In order for an invention to be patent
eligible, it must be both new and represent a nontrivial advancement over the current state of the
art. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2012). If an invention was obvious to the person of ordinary skill in the
art or was already in the public domain, the invention would have likely arisen without the patent
incentive. See id. § 103. In contrast, an invention that represents a significant advancement in the
art may not have arisen but for the patent inducement.
61. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that allowing patents on obvious
inventions can thwart competition); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 119–25 (2006) (discussing the chilling effect
invalid patents have on other potential innovators).
62. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on
the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991)
(noting that overly broad patent protection “can lead to deficient incentives to develop second
generation products”).
63. See Leslie, supra note 61, at 104.
64. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 8 (“The threat of being sued for infringement
by an incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital
financing.” (quoting public comment of Joshua Lerner, Professor, Harvard Business School)).
65. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (“Dow alleged that Exxon had threatened to sue actual and prospective Dow customers for
patent infringement, even though Exxon allegedly had no good-faith belief that Dow infringed the
patent when Exxon made the threats and had allegedly obtained the patent by inequitable
conduct.” (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1472, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)));
Leslie, supra note 61, at 125–27 (noting how further innovation may be stymied).
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three pieces of information: (1) the costs associated with litigating
patents, (2) how many fewer patents would be issued if the Patent Office
increased the time allocations of examiners, and (3) the relationship
between the amount of time extended to an examiner to review an
application and the number of times any patent resulting from that
application might one day become the subject of litigation. While
Lemley was forced to guess these latter two relationships, we draw from
sophisticated empirical methodologies to provide empirically driven
estimates of them. In doing so, we hope to provide a more accurate
picture of the savings associated with the Patent Office issuing fewer
bad patents.
Before proceeding to the details of our analysis, we should note
that the simple ex ante versus ex post (that is, Agency versus courts)
debate is more complicated now than in 2001, when Lemley wrote his
seminal article. In 2012, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”),
which provides a court-like option at the Agency, was introduced into
the patent system.66 More specifically, PTAB provides for a robust
adjudicatory pathway in which third parties can challenge the issuance
of a patent at the Patent Office.67 The analysis below incorporates
consideration of PTAB into our cost-benefit calculation.
This proceeds as follows. First, we provide a summary of patentlitigation expenses in federal courts and in PTAB proceedings. Second,
we delineate the theory of why increasing the time examiners review
patent applications would lead to a savings in litigation costs. Third, we
empirically estimate how much litigation savings in federal courts may
ensue from a doubling of the amount of time allocated to examiners to
review applications. Fourth, we repeat the exercises from Section II.A.3
but focus on the litigation savings associated with PTAB adjudication.
1. Background on Litigation Expenses
Potentially substantial litigation savings may ensue by
preventing invalid patents from issuing in the first place. After all,
patent litigation in federal court is very expensive. The American
Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) reports that when $10
million to $25 million of damages are at risk, the median cost of patent
litigation is $1 million for each side through the end of discovery and

66. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, 313–15 (2011);
see also Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1981–88 (2013) (describing the court-like aspects of these new
proceedings).
67. See Wasserman, supra note 66, at 1981–88 (describing the procedural details associated
with PTAB adjudication).
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$2 million for each side through trial and appeal.68 These litigation
costs scale upward and downward depending on the amount at risk. For
instance, the median cost of patent litigation when more than $25
million is at risk to each side is $1.7 million through the end of discovery
and $3 million through trial and appeal.69
Federal district courts, however, are no longer the only venue in
which the validity of issued patents can be challenged. Since 2012,
issued patents can also be challenged before PTAB.70 These new
proceedings, which provide a robust pathway for third parties to
challenge the validity of issued patents at the Agency, are supposed to
provide a cost-effective alternative to challenging patents in federal
courts.71 Reflecting this intention, these new proceedings share a host
of features that mimic certain characteristics of a civil trial.72
While Congress intended for PTAB to act as a substitute to
federal district court litigation, suits may be brought in both venues;
empirical evidence to date suggests that the overwhelming number of
patents that are subject to a petition before PTAB are also subject to
district court litigation.73 Although PTAB has proved a popular venue
in which to challenge issued patents, the vast majority of patents whose
validity is challenged are litigated only in Article III courts.74 The costs
associated with challenging patents in a PTAB proceeding are
significant, even though they are lower than the expenses associated
with federal court litigation. The AIPLA reports the median cost of postgrant proceedings before the Patent Office to each side is $200,000

68. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2017)
[hereinafter AIPLA 2017 REPORT]. We acknowledge that there may be some noise in the AIPLAreported numbers, but we have no reason to believe that the AIPLA-reported numbers are biased
in one direction or another. We also note that Mark Lemley also utilized AIPLA-reported numbers
in his cost-benefit analysis. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1502.
69. AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 41.
70. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 7.
71. The House Report on the America Invents Act (“AIA”) states that the Act intended to
“convert[ ] inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding” while
establishing a new agency procedure known as post-grant review that “would take place in a courtlike proceeding.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46, 68 (2011).
72. Wasserman, supra note 66, at 1981–88. Perhaps most saliently, the Patent Act requires
these new administrative hearings to take place through an adversarial, court-like hearing in
which parties are entitled to oral arguments and discovery. Id.
73. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 81 (2016) (finding that seventy
percent of patents associated with a petition before PTAB are also subject to federal court patent
litigation).
74. Id. at 69 (finding approximately eighty-five percent of patents (11,787 out of 14,218 cases)
whose validity are challenged are subject to federal district court litigation only).
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through the end of motion practice, $250,000 through the PTAB
hearing, and $350,000 through appeal.75
Though these expenses are considerable, patent challenges—
whether brought in federal district court or PTAB proceedings—are
relatively rare. Only roughly 17,000 of the issued patents in our sample
of over 2.7 million over a sixteen-year period were asserted in federal
court. Of course, even if ex post litigation is rare, meaningful savings
could still be achieved from further embracing an ex ante approach if
the amount of litigation that is forestalled in the process is large
enough. Before addressing the empirical methodology underlying our
attempt to determine the amount of litigation savings, this Article
addresses why, conceptually, more investment at the examination stage
may lead to less litigation in the first place.
2. Why Greater Examination Scrutiny May Lead to
Litigation Savings
To begin this conceptual discussion, recall that the number of
patents issued by the Patent Office may be expected to go down if
examiners are given more time, as examiners may be better able to
determine and articulate a basis to reject the invalid application. As
discussed in Section I.A, we estimate that a doubling of the amount of
time given to examiners will lower the Patent Office’s grant rate by
roughly 27% (or by 19 percentage points).76 Importantly, our prior
research also demonstrates that the forgone issuance of patents are
likely of dubious quality. Considering the present level of application
disposals per year, this suggests that upward of eighty-one thousand
fewer patents would be allowed each year if examiners were given twice
as much time to review applications.
Now, why might we see litigation savings following these
reductions in the number of patents issued? The first reason is perhaps
self-evident: with fewer patents in issue, there is less opportunity for
dispute to arise at all—whether based on infringement or validity. As
such, we may see less litigation. Second, as discussed in Section I.A,
because the patents that would cease to issue upon doubling examiner
time allocations are likely to be of dubious quality, we may see a
reduction in litigation to the extent that at least some patent litigation
is driven by challenging the validity of low-quality patents. These may
be lawsuits that would have otherwise commenced as declaratory
judgment actions by non-patent holders wishing to invalidate another’s
75. AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 51.
76. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 2–4.
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patents or as infringement actions by patent holders in the shadow of
strong threats to file declaratory judgment actions by the non-patent
holders. They may also represent lawsuits that would have otherwise
been filed by a subset of non-practicing entities that have acquired a
pool of low-quality patents and that seek nuisance settlements.77
3. Empirical Investigation of the Link Between Examination
Time Allocations and Litigation Savings
Moving from theory to empirics, this Section seeks to estimate
just how much litigation savings may ensue from doubling the amount
of time allocated to examiners to review applications. To approach this
question, we start by collecting data on individual patent applications
from the Patent Office’s Patent Application Information Retrieval
(“PAIR”) database, covering over 3.9 million utility patent applications
filed on or after March 2001 and reaching a final disposition by May
2017—i.e., excluding ongoing applications. Importantly, for each
application, we possess information on the name of the examiner
primarily charged with reviewing the application.78 To these data, we
merge information on the future litigation (and PTAB) outcomes of
those applications that culminate in patent issuance. For these
purposes, we collected data on all patent lawsuits filed since January
2001 from the Lex Machina database. We organize these data by patent
number and determine the number of times each such patent is
asserted in litigation. We do the same using data on PTAB filings that
were graciously provided to us by Arti Rai and Jacob Sherkow. To these
data, we also merge information on the GS-level of the associated
examiner at the time of application disposition, which is necessary to
determine the examiner’s time allocation. Information on the GS-level
for each of the roughly twelve thousand examiners represented in our

77. This discussion has focused on litigation savings due to a reduction in the volume of
issued patents, especially legally invalid patents. Theoretically, similar results may also arise from
effects of time-allocation expansions on the scope of claims allowed by patent examiners. Imagine
an application that an examiner would have allowed anyway, regardless of the time extended to
her. With more time to review the application, the examiner may have further scrutinized the
breadth of the claim scope sought by the applicant—e.g., she would have rejected a patent covering
a flying car but would have allowed a patent covering a fusion-powered flying car. As the scope of
claims issued by the Patent Office narrows, we may likewise see less litigation to the extent that
some amount of litigation is also originated in part due to a desire to challenge the validity of
patents in issue in light of the inappropriate scope of the claims (or originated in part to seek a
nuisance settlement based on the assertion of a low-quality patent with excessive scope).
78. We treat the individual who did the majority of work on the application as the examiner
charged with reviewing that application—the nonsignatory examiner, when both a nonsignatory
and an examiner with signatory authority are associated with an application, or the signatory
examiner, when only one examiner is associated with an application.
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analytical file come from an examiner roster indicating GS-level
promotion dates for each examiner, which we received pursuant to a
FOIA request.
With these data in place, we then seek to estimate empirical
specifications capturing the relationship between the number of times
that a given patent application is ultimately asserted in court (or in a
PTAB proceeding) and the number of hours extended to the examiner
to review the given application. This estimate will capture both of the
theorized mechanisms regarding the link between time allocations and
litigation savings: (1) reduced litigation due to the fact that time
allocation expansions will decrease the overall number of issued
patents and thus decrease the baseline probability of any dispute
arising and (2) reduced litigation due to the fact that time allocation
expansions will decrease the number of invalid patents that issue and
thus decrease litigation activity that is specifically stimulated by the
issuance of invalid patents. Since our goal is to understand how
doubling time allocations for all examiners may lead to a reduction in
overall litigation, we attempt to capture both such mechanisms by
estimating the relationship in question using a sample of filed
applications (as distinct from issued patents) as the baseline sample.
To evaluate how examination time may affect litigation
outcomes, it is necessary to draw on some degree of variation in
examination time allotments. To understand where this variation
comes from, remember that time allocations are a function of two
factors: the examiner’s GS-level and the technology group in the Patent
Office to which the examiner is assigned. Given this basic structure, we
seek to determine how the litigation outcomes for the underlying
applications change as examiners ascend through the GS scale. We
capture this relationship by regressing the number of times the
application is asserted in litigation on dummy variables for the different
GS-levels—e.g., a dichotomous variable indicating whether the
associated examiner is at GS-level 7, a dichotomous variable indicating
whether the examiner is at GS-level 9, and so forth. Specifically, given
the rarity and count-like structure of the litigation outcomes (i.e.,
measures that take on integer levels greater than or equal to zero), we
do not estimate Ordinary Least Squares regressions but instead
estimate conditional negative binomial regression models. Within this
regression framework, we include fixed effects for the technology group
to which the examiner is assigned, such that we account for fixed
differences in litigation frequencies across technologies. In essence, this
approach compares litigation outcomes across GS-levels within a given
technology group. Since time allocations are a function of GS-level and
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technology, this forces us to focus on the variation in time allocations
that arises solely through variation in GS-levels.79
Of course, one may be concerned that changes in GS-levels may
be correlated with other factors that likewise change over time and
affect litigation outcomes, confounding any ability to suggest that the
relationship we find between GS-levels and litigation rates can be
attributed to time-allocation effects. It is thus important to account for
as many such factors as possible. Accordingly, we also include a series
of fixed effects for the following factors: (1) the year in which the
application is disposed of, to account for changing litigation patterns
over time, as the quality of the issued patent, and general economic
conditions; (2) the experience level of the examiner (in two-year bins),
to better isolate the time-allocation aspect of GS-level promotions and
account for the correlation between GS-levels and experience (and thus
account for the fact that issued patent quality may change with
examiner experience for independent reasons);80 (3) the year in which
the examiner joined the Patent Office, to account for changes in the
conditions under which examiners were trained, which may have longlasting impacts on the quality of their reviews throughout their
career;81 and (4) the ultimate tenure of the examiner at the Patent
Office—i.e., the total number of years the relevant examiner ultimately
spends with the Patent Office—to account for the fact that examiners
that leave the Agency at different stages to pursue outside
opportunities may differ in their fundamental examination quality. 82
We focus our estimation sample on those patent applications
that were disposed of prior to 2014. We exclude dispositions subsequent

79. If we were to try to identify the effect of hour allocations by isolating variations in time
allotment across technology groups, it would be very difficult to separate the effect of time
allotments themselves from differences in litigation (and other) outcomes due to the nature of the
different technologies. We prefer instead to focus on exploring dynamics entirely within given
technological groups.
80. We organize experience groups into two-year bins following the methodological insight of
our previous research, Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 550, given the perfect identity
between hiring-year cohort effects, year effects, and experience effects that would otherwise occur
if they were all grouped at the same level (i.e., experience = cohort + time).
81. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601,
1602, 1605 (2016).
82. In Table 2, we do not include examiner fixed effects—i.e., do not account for fixed
differences in litigation frequencies across every single examiner—because including examiner
effects and technology-group fixed effects in a conditional negative binomial regression with over
three million observations represents a rather cumbersome estimation exercise. Nonetheless, in
our prior research on grant rates as the key outcome to be measured, we found that accounting for
disposition year effects, examiner hiring year effects, examiner tenure effects, and examiner
experience effects (all of which we include in the present Article) leads to estimates that are
virtually identical to estimates that include examiner fixed effects. Frakes & Wasserman, supra
note 12, online app. at 8.
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to this point as there is generally a notable gap in time between when
patents issue and when we observe assertions in federal court. Since
the goal of the analysis is to understand what determines federal court
outcomes, we do not wish to attenuate our results by including a set of
applications for which there is not sufficient time to observe litigation
outcomes. This brings the size of the analytical regression sample down
to roughly 2.6 million applications. Nonetheless, we stress that the
regression results are virtually identical when we instead include all
3.9 million applications, including those disposed of from 2014 to 2017.
To be clear, this restriction of excluding applications disposed of after
2014 relates only to the sample of applications whose time allocations
we are evaluating. For the litigation outcomes, we are continuing to use
data as near to the present as possible. In this way we are, for instance,
including applications disposed of in 2013 to see if they are litigated by
2017.83
We present the results of this exercise in Column 1 of Table 2.
The reported coefficients are to be interpreted as incidence rate ratios
(“IRR”). For instance, the estimated IRR of 1.26 for the GS-level 9
coefficient suggests that the applications reviewed by GS-level 9
examiners are litigated at 1.26 times the rate of applications reviewed
by the reference group—i.e., GS-level 7 examiners. In other words, the
GS-level 9 applications are litigated at a 26% higher rate. Importantly,
we find that the degree of litigation rises monotonically with GS-level,
suggesting that litigation becomes more likely the more that
examination times are cut by the Patent Office. For purposes of this
Article, this pattern of results suggests that litigation becomes less
likely as examination times are expanded.
As noted above, to facilitate a comparison of our analysis with
that of Lemley’s, we examine the litigation savings stemming from
doubling the examination time allotments. Considering that
examination time falls by almost exactly half as examiners ascend from
GS-level 7 to GS-level 14, comparing the litigation outcomes between
these two levels provides us with an opportunity to explore the effect of
cutting—or doubling, when considering the relationship in reverse—the
assigned examination time in half. Given that GS-level 7 is the
reference category in Table 2, it is relatively straightforward to make
this comparison—that is, to simply observe the estimated coefficient of
the GS-level 14 dummy. Doing so suggests that if examination time is
cut in half, the number of times an application is ultimately asserted in
83. For the reasons that we discuss in the Online Appendix, we drop GS-level 5 and GSlevel 15 examiners from our analysis, though we note that this decision has little to no bearing on
our results and the conclusions we reach. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 3.
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litigation increases by roughly 78%, as suggested by the IRR of 1.78. If
we consider a move in the reverse direction—i.e., doubling the amount
of examination time—an IRR of 1.78 suggests that moving from GSlevel 14 to GS-level 7 hours brings the incidence rate from a normalized
rate of 1.78 to the reference rate of 1.0, representing a roughly 44%
decrease in the incidence rate. In other words, by doubling the amount
of examination time, we may expect to observe a 44% reduction in the
rate that an application will be expected to result in a patent that is
asserted in litigation (relative to the baseline mean).84 This may be due
to the fact that the expansion in examination time leads to the issuance
of fewer patents overall and fewer invalid patents in particular.85

84. In unreported regressions, we also estimate specifications where we limit the sample to
issued patents. In this alternative approach, we estimate a similar pattern of increasing rates of
litigation as examiners ascend GS-levels. This implies that the results from Table 2 may, in part,
reflect a response to the second mechanism identified above. That is, we do not merely see more
litigation as examination time decreases because there are more patents issued and thus more
opportunities to litigate. We also find that those legally invalid patents being issued on the margin
in connection with GS-level changes are more likely to be asserted in court relative to the average
issued patent. In other words, our findings suggest that legally invalid patents do attract more
litigation, in which case decreasing the number of legally invalid patents via enhanced time
allocations to examiners may further reduce litigation frequencies.
85. Again, this may also be due to a response to increased time allocations in which examiners
issue patents with narrower scopes. On a final note, this 44% estimate remains nearly the same
when taking an alternative approach in which we simply assign a variable to each application
equal to the number of hours allotted to the associated examiner based on the GS-level and
technology group of that examiner. We then estimate the same negative binomial regression model
as above but replace the series of GS-level dummy variables with this sample-hours variable. We
leave this as a robustness exercise in that it is less flexible and more parametric than the preferred
approach from Table 2 as it fits a linear hours relationship—e.g., it implicitly assumes, for
instance, that a move from six to seven hours of time allocation will have the same impact as a
move from thirty-two to thirty-three hours. Also, this approach will simulate the effect of
increasing the number of hours allocated by the average hours allotment over our sample, 17.9
hours, even though this will not represent a true doubling for above- and below-average hour
allotment technology groups. The GS-level 7 and GS-level 14 comparison by design will simulate
the effect of doubling hour allotments for all technology groups. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that
these approaches yield similar results.
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TABLE 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND THE
NUMBER OF TIMES INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS ARE ASSERTED IN
LITIGATION AND INSTITUTED IN PTAB PROCEEDINGS: NEGATIVE
BINOMIAL REGRESSION RESULTS
(1)

(2)

Dependent Variable:
Number of Times
Ultimately Asserted in
Litigation

Dependent Variable:
Number of Times
Ultimately Instituted
in PTAB Proceeding

Incident Rate Ratios for:
(Omitted: GS-7)
GS-9
GS-11
GS-12
GS-13
GS-14
N

1.26**
(0.13)
1.29***
(0.14)
1.36***
(0.15)
1.59***
(0.17)
1.78***
(0.19)
2,631,302

2.18
(1.06)
3.41***
(1.60)
2.91**
(1.38)
3.12**
(1.48)
3.55***
(1.68)
2,229,496

Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a
given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that
was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and December 2014.
Litigation outcomes are tracked through 2017, however, and PTAB outcomes are
tracked through March 2016. The underlying negative binomial regressions
producing these relationships account for fixed differences in litigation (or PTAB)
outcomes across technology groups and across year, while also controlling for the
entity size of the applicant and a range of examiner characteristics: experience (at
the time of application disposition), ultimate tenure at the Patent Office, and hiring
year. Reported coefficients are to be interpreted as incidence rate ratios, as
discussed in the main text. Further specifics are provided in the Online Appendix.

This estimate allows us to turn to determining how much
litigation savings may ensue from a doubling of examination time. For
these purposes, we use information on the cost of patent litigation from
the AIPLA, capturing costs associated with outside and local counsel;
paralegal services; travel and living expenses; fees and costs for court
reporters, copies, couriers, exhibit preparation, analytical testing,
expert witnesses, and similar expenses. The AIPLA estimates are onesided only, in that they only use costs associated with defending a suit,
thereby omitting costs associated with the parties asserting the
underlying patents. For the total savings estimates that we present,
however, we assume that the plaintiff costs match those of the defense.
Supporting this assumption, the 2015 AIPLA economic survey
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indicated that a majority of survey respondents reported that assertion
costs are the same as defense costs.86
We present our estimated litigation-cost savings in Table 3.
Column 1 acknowledges that, at the present, 430,056 utility patent
applications are disposed of each year. The average number of times
each application will culminate in a patent that is the subject of
litigation at federal district court is 0.0129, in which event we predict
that of these 430,056 disposals we will expect to observe roughly 5,561
patent-lawsuit pairs, as reported in Column 2. We treat the outcome of
interest as a patent-lawsuit pair, acknowledging that individual
lawsuits may cover a group of patents. Next, we predict the reduction
in the number of these patent-lawsuit pairs that is implied by the
regression estimate from Table 2—i.e., a 44% reduction in the number
of times a patent will be the subject of a lawsuit due to a doubling of
examination time. Doing so, we anticipate observing 2,436 fewer
patent-lawsuit pairs per year, as reported in Column 3. We then
translate this amount into litigation savings per year.
In the Online Appendix, we derive an estimate for the expected
litigation costs associated with an average patent-lawsuit pair. For such
purposes, we draw on data from several sources: (1) the annual Report
of the Economic Survey from the AIPLA, which provides annual
breakdowns of average litigation costs associated with cases, set forth
by stages of litigation reached and by amounts at stake in the lawsuit;
(2) a recent working paper by Christopher Cotropia and colleagues, A
Granular Analysis of Civil Litigation,87 which, among things, assesses
the distribution of case terminations across different stages of trial for
sixteen thousand patent infringement lawsuits; and (3) data on patent
infringement lawsuits from the Lex Machina database, including
information on the resulting damages for those suits with damages
awards. As explained in far greater depth in the Online Appendix, with
these data, we derive the probability distribution associated with
different types of lawsuits—consisting of different combinations of
amounts at stake and the litigation stage at time of case termination—
along with the costs associated with litigating the relevant lawsuit
type.88 With this distribution, we estimate that the total litigation costs
associated with an average lawsuit is $539,949.89 To determine the
average cost per patent-lawsuit pair, we divide this estimate by the

86. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2015).
87. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, Kyle Rozema & David L. Schartz, A Granular
Analysis of Civil Litigation (Aug. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
88. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 9–12.
89. Id. at 11.
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average number of patents that are included in each case filing over our
sample period (2.3 years) to arrive at an estimated cost per patentlawsuit pair ($234,761).90 Considering the number of patent-lawsuit
pairs that we predict will be eliminated by doubling examination hours,
we predict that doubling examination time will be associated with a
savings in future litigation expenses per year of roughly $572 million.91
Because the litigation savings will occur in the future but the
costs associated with doubling patent examiner time allocations and the
patent prosecution legal savings occur immediately, the final step of our
calculation will adjust the litigation savings to account for this
difference in timing.92 Calculating the present value of future litigation
savings requires two additional pieces of information: (1) how far into
the future the litigation savings will materialize and (2) the appropriate
discount rate. We obtain the first piece of information by calculating the
age distribution of patents litigated. We find that on average patents
experience their first litigation filing 3.1 years following the date of
allowance. Of course, many of the patents over our sample period are
litigated more than once. When considering the full distribution of
litigated patents and the time to litigation for the second, third, etc.
times that a patent is litigated, we find that the average patent
litigation begins roughly 3.4 years following the date of allowance. We
next acknowledge that not all litigation expenses are incurred at the
time a lawsuit is filed. The bulk of litigation expenses accounted for in
our estimate of the costs per patent-lawsuit pair are attributed to the
expenses incurred up to the end of discovery or claim construction.
According to the working paper by Cotropia and colleagues, this
milestone occurs, on average, twenty-two months after the lawsuit is
filed.93 Compiling this information, we thus envision that the expenses
associated with the average patent-lawsuit pair will occur roughly 5.2
years following the date of patent issuance.
Next, we consider the appropriate discount rate. There is a
growing literature considering the choice of discount rates in regulatory

90. Id. at 11.
91. We calculate this number by multiplying the estimated cost per patent-lawsuit pair of
$234,761 by the number of 2,436 forgone patent-lawsuit pairs per year.
92. Technically, the increase in examination costs (and estimated reduction in prosecution
expenses) are not all incurred simultaneously but are instead incurred over a period of time. To
simplify matters, however, we elect not to discount these examination-related figures. Rather, we
elect to start the clock, for discounting purposes, at the moment of time in which the relevant
patents are issued. The key point for the purposes of this discussion is simply that the litigation
savings will be incurred at a later period of time.
93. Cotropia et al., supra note 87 (manuscript at 18).
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settings.94 If the Patent Office increases examiner time allocations, as
discussed in Section III.A below, the Agency would likely cover these
additional personnel expenses by increasing its fees. An increase in fees
of this magnitude would be an “economically significant” regulation—
that is, the increase would be considered a rule that creates an economic
impact of at least $100 million.95 This would require the Patent Office
to perform a cost-benefit analysis similar to the one outlined in this
Article.96 Therefore, we elect to utilize the discount rates suggested by
the Office of Management and Budget of 3% and 7%, as the Patent
Office would be required to do as well.97 Using a 3% discount rate and
considering the average time to litigation, we find that the $572 million
in annual litigation savings stated above is presently valued at $491
million. If we were to use a 7% discount rate, this figure would fall to
$402 million.
Finally, how does the existence of PTAB, which came into effect
in September 2012, complicate the analysis that relies on application
and federal court litigation data from 2001 through 2017? To the extent
that PTAB creates a substitute for the litigation of a patent’s validity
in federal courts, one may be concerned that PTAB would dampen the
relationship between examination time and the degree of litigation
savings. As such, one may be concerned that we are overstating the
degree of litigation savings as an ongoing matter by using litigation
data from the entire post-2001 time period—over ten years of which the
PTAB did not exist.98

94. See William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 788 (1968);
Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Frank Partnoy, Corporations and
Human Life, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 399 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting
Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (2007).
95. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993).
96. In 1981, President Reagan mandated by Executive Order that administrative agencies
perform cost-benefit analysis for all economically significant regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,291,
§ 2(d), 48 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (Feb. 19, 1982). This mandate has remained in force across
every subsequent administration. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735
(Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (Obama).
97. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 30–31 (1991)
(discussing the requirement to use a discount rate of three percent and seven percent).
98. At the outset of this discussion, we justify our choice of using the longer time period given
the complexities of our empirical design. We are trying to trace out how litigation likelihoods (and
patent grant rates) evolve as GS-levels of examiners change while also separating GS-level effects
from general overall time trends in litigation rates, changes in experience levels of examiners, etc.
This separation exercise requires notable temporal breadth in the data, limiting our ability to do
so while only focusing on the most recent time period. It is also critical to use a long time period in
light of the gap in years that often spans between patents issuing and being the subject of
subsequent litigation.
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TABLE 3: SIMULATED REDUCTION IN LITIGATION EXPENSES
ASSOCIATED WITH DOUBLING AMOUNT OF TIME ALLOCATED
TO EXAMINERS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Number of
Annual
Reviews
Completed
by
Examiners

Expected Number
of Federal CaseApplication Pairs
Arising from
Annual Reviews

Estimated Decrease
in Number of Patent
Case-Application
Pairs from Doubling
Examination Hours

Estimated Decrease
in Litigation Costs
from Doubling
Examination Hours

430,056

5,561

2,436

$571,876,758.10

The number of applications disposed of by the Patent Office that is indicated in
Column 1 is based on the number of dispositions of regular utility patent
applications from the 2016 PAIR data. Expected litigation outcomes for these
dispositions is based on the mean number of times an application is litigated in
court based on the PAIR data merged with litigation data from the Lex Machina
database. The estimated decrease in litigation events reported in Column 3 is
derived from the results from Table 4. The litigation cost data that form the basis
for the estimates in Column 4 are from the (AIPLA surveys, as discussed in further
detail in the Online Appendix.

To address this concern, we begin by examining whether PTAB
is in fact a substitute for federal court litigation. At the onset, we note
that preliminary evidence put forth by others tends to refute this
substitution hypothesis. As noted above, the overwhelming number of
patents that are subject to a petition before PTAB are also the subject
of an action before a federal district court.99 Moreover, the vast majority
of patents whose validity is challenged in any capacity are still only
litigated in federal district court.100 In our own data, litigation rates
appear to be comparable before and after the America Invents Act
(“AIA”), which created PTAB, further cutting against the substitution
hypothesis. More specifically, we find that the number of times a patent
application ultimately becomes the subject of a federal lawsuit is
slightly larger in the post-AIA period relative to the pre-AIA period.101
99. See Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 73, at 81.
100. Id. at 69.
101. To determine this, we compare the mean number of times that a patent application
becomes the subject of a federal patent lawsuit filed during the four years following the AIA’s
effective date—i.e., 2013 to 2016—with the mean number of times that a patent application
becomes the subject of a federal patent lawsuit filed during the four years prior to the AIA’s
passage—i.e., 2008 to 2011. This comparison is of course difficult given the time lag between when
patents issue and when they are litigated, which means we do not necessarily want to limit
ourselves to patent applications that were filed during those two windows. However, we also want
to make sure to keep consistent across the comparison groups the length of time we observe
applications so that we equalize exposure and lawsuit-filing opportunity periods across our two
comparison groups. Accordingly, when determining the 2013 to 2016 litigation likelihood, we do so
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To further address the concern that we overestimate litigation
savings in light of PTAB’s creation in 2012, we assess whether our
estimated relationship between time allocations and reduced litigation
events is affected by the inclusion or exclusion of post-AIA data. We find
that the removal of the post-AIA years from our sample has no effect on
our estimates from Table 2 that a doubling of examination time
allocations results in a 44% reduction in the number of times an
application is ultimately the subject of a federal patent lawsuit.102
Taken in tandem, these two findings—that is, more litigation
events after the AIA and hours-litigation-rate estimates that are
unaffected by the AIA—suggest that our federal court litigation savings
analysis is unchanged by the introduction of PTAB.103 In fact, the

while focusing on those applications disposed of by the Patent Office between 2009 and 2012—i.e.,
the four years leading up to the effective date of the AIA. And when determining the 2008 to 2011
litigation likelihood, we do so while focusing on those applications disposed of by the Patent Office
between 2004 and 2007—i.e., the four years leading up to the relevant litigation observation
period.
More specifically, we find that the number of times a patent application ultimately becomes
the subject of a federal lawsuit is larger in the post-AIA period (0.009) relative to the pre-AIA
period (0.007). We do not mean to create any inference that the fundamental degree of litigiousness
increased after the AIA based on this fact. Any such inference is not necessary for the point of this
Article’s cost-benefit exercise. In fact, part of this increase in expected litigation outcomes may be
attributable to the heightening of the joinder standard set forth in Section 299 of the AIA, which
made it more difficult for plaintiffs to join multiple defendants in a single case. See 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 299 (West 2019). We do not dispute the possibility that this joinder provision may have
contributed to a higher than expected number of patent-lawsuit pairs arising from insufficient
time allocations, but this does not undermine our analysis. On the contrary, it perhaps reinforces
it. The arguable inefficiencies in this joinder reform may only heighten what is at stake in terms
of the litigation costs stemming from examination time deficiencies and thus the savings that may
arise in litigation expenses from giving examiners more time.
102. By “pre-AIA years,” we mean that we focus only on applications that were disposed of and
lawsuits that were filed prior to the AIA being enacted.
103. Out of those fewer patent-lawsuit pairs that we predict will result each year as a result
of doubling time allocations, it is likely that a small subset of these pairs will exist
contemporaneously with ongoing PTAB challenges. We acknowledge that in this case the litigation
costs associated with these pairs may be lower than the average costs that we calculate for a
patent-lawsuit pair in the Online Appendix to the extent that the federal litigation itself may be
stayed during the course of the PTAB proceedings. While this may mean that we are overstating
our litigation savings, it is unlikely that we would be doing so by an extensive amount. To begin,
only a small number of cases would be of this overlapping nature. As stated elsewhere in this
Article, the expected number of times an application will be asserted in litigation is 0.0129,
whereas the expected number of times an application will be the subject of a PTAB institution is
0.00088. In other words, litigation is over fourteen times as likely as a PTAB institution. If we
conservatively assume that all PTAB institutions are also the subject of litigation, this would still
suggest that only 7% of the patent-lawsuit pairs are also the subject of a PTAB institution
(0.00088 / 0.0129). Even if we further conservatively assume that the litigation costs associated
with these 7% of cases are only half of the amount reported by the AIPLA for litigation expenses
up to the point of case management, this would mean that our litigation savings would fall by only
$31 million per year, down to a total of $540 million per year in savings.
There is even good reason to believe that the litigation savings would not fall down to $540
million in light of stayed litigation. To arrive at the litigation-savings estimates reported in Table
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introduction of PTAB only reinforces this Article’s conclusion that the
savings from increased examination time justify the costs. After all, if
increased examination time reduces the issuance of invalid patents,
this may also lead to savings in PTAB-related legal expenses. In the
following Section, we attempt to estimate such additional savings.
4. Empirical Investigation of the Link Between Examination Time
Allocations and PTAB Savings
To investigate the amount of PTAB savings that may ensue from
increasing examination time, we utilize the same methodological
approach employed in the preceding Section but switch outcome
variables. Instead of exploring how doubling examination time leads to
a change in the number of times a patent application ultimately winds
up in litigation, we explore how it leads to a change in the number of
times an application ultimately winds up the subject of a PTAB
proceeding.104
Column 2 of Table 2 estimates the same specification estimated
in Column 1 (which pertained to litigation frequencies) but replaces the
3, we utilize patent-application data from the full post-2001 period. We do so as this enables a
more reliable estimate of the amount of patent-lawsuit pairs that may be reduced by doubling
patent examination hours given the cumbersome empirical task associated with separating the
effects of GS-level changes from experience effects, annual changes in grant rates and litigation
outcomes, and other factors. Nonetheless, if we really want to understand what the litigation
savings are in the post-PTAB/post-AIA era in light of this concern over litigation stays in that
small amount of cases with an overlap, we would arguably want to focus solely on post-AIA data
in producing the total litigation savings estimate. It would seem inappropriate to fully discount
the average annual savings we estimate using data from the post-2001 era by 7% when PTABrelated stays only became relevant at the end of that period. As discussed above, when we
reestimate the relationship between GS-level changes and litigation likelihoods focusing on postAIA data, our point estimates do not change. If anything, the underlying rate of litigation itself
increases notably following the AIA—by as much as 25% relative to the mean—in which event we
might predict a greater reduction in the number of patent-lawsuit pairs by focusing only on this
recent data. Relatedly, the numbers of patents per case is lower in recent years, in which event
the per-case amounts reported by the AIPLA (and that are key inputs to our calculations in the
Online Appendix) would not need to be scaled down by as much as we are doing to produce Table
3. All told, if we were to attempt to predict the amount of annual litigation savings from doubling
examination hours just considering post-AIA years, the savings would likely exceed that reported
in Table 3 by a percentage amount exceeding 7%. Accordingly, we see no reason to believe that the
concern over stayed litigation arising in the post-AIA period (for overlap cases) will change the
ultimate conclusion that we reach in this Article—i.e., that the savings associated with doubling
examination hours will likely exceed the costs.
104. This exercise is likely to produce slightly noisier estimates for two reasons. First, as
already discussed, PTAB is used less frequently than litigation. Second, even though patent
applications filed throughout the sample period have implicated PTAB challenges, such challenges
were only filed subsequent to September 2012, when PTAB became effective, unlike litigation,
which was naturally an option all throughout the sample period. This only further reduces the
mean incidence of PTAB over our sample of applications. With lower baseline rates, it presents a
greater statistical challenge in estimating the impacts of GS-level changes on PTAB challenge
frequencies.
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outcome measure of interest, instead using the number of times the
relevant patent application became the subject of a PTAB challenge up
to March 2016, when our PTAB data ends. As with litigation outcomes,
we continue to find that the number of times an application results in a
patent that is the subject of a PTAB challenge rises as the amount of
examination time associated with that application falls, as identified by
changes in the GS-levels of the associated examiners.105 As before, the
GS-level 14 coefficient—which is to be interpreted with reference to a
GS-level 7 effect—provides us with a way to explore the effect of
doubling examination time on PTAB events. The results imply that the
normalized incidence rate of PTAB activity at GS-level 14 is roughly
3.55 relative to the baseline incidence rate of 1.0 for GS-level 7. Moving
examiners from GS-level 14 to GS-level 7 time allocations—i.e.,
doubling their time—would thus lead to a roughly 72% (2.55 / 3.55)
reduction in the frequency of PTAB challenges.
In Table 4, we consider what this reduction implies in terms of
PTAB expense savings. Table 4 follows the same structure of Table 3 in
the case of litigation savings. To understand the computation of the
savings estimates in Column 4, first note that 430,056 utility patent
applications are disposed of each year, as reported in Column 1. The
average number of times these applications will culminate in a patent
that becomes the subject of a PTAB challenge is 0.00088, in which event
we predict that of those 430,056 disposals roughly 378 will be the
subject of an instituted PTAB petition.106 By doubling examination
time, we predict that this number will fall by 72%, or by 272 instituted
PTAB challenges. To determine the total savings in PTAB-related
litigation expenses stemming from this reduction in PTAB challenges,
we multiply this amount by the average litigation costs associated with
PTAB proceedings, which we likewise derive from the Annual Report of
the Economic Survey of the AIPLA, as discussed in greater detail in the
Online Appendix.107 All told, our analysis implies a considerable degree
of savings—over $123 million.
Similar to the litigation savings presented in Section II.A.3, we
must account for the difference in time associated with the PTAB-

105. This pattern is not perfectly monotonic, however. In general, PTAB frequencies rise with
each iterative GS-level promotion, except that there is an especially high spike in PTAB
frequencies for GS-level 11 applications. Again, however, some noise in this relationship is to be
expected given the notable rarity in ultimate PTAB challenges over our entire sample of
applications.
106. This estimate is nearly unchanged when we instead consider the mean number of PTAB
challenges over the full sample period, including applications disposed of all the way up until the
last period for which we have data on PTAB challenges (March 2016).
107. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 9–12.
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related litigation savings. Unfortunately, it is not altogether
straightforward how to go about determining the average time gap
between patent issuance and the onset of PTAB proceedings, at least as
a matter moving forward. The key difficulty in doing so is that PTAB
proceedings did not begin until late 2012, in which event the gap
between patent issuance and PTAB proceedings using data from our
full sample period would provide a misleading sense of the true gap.
Moreover, the difficulty with relying on patents issued in recent years
is that the data is naturally truncated at the right end, likewise leaving
an imperfect sense of the true gap between patent issuance and PTAB
proceedings. To address these concerns, we simply focus on those
patents issued in 2012. With this restriction, we find that the average
time between patent issuance and the onset of PTAB proceedings is 2.1
years. We assume that the bulk of the PTAB expenses associated with
each PTAB challenge are incurred one year after the filing of a PTAB
challenge. As such, we discount the $123 million in savings by 3.1 years,
which, using a 3% discount rate, suggests an annual savings of $112
million ($100 million if we were to use a 7% discount rate).
TABLE 4: SIMULATED REDUCTION IN PTAB EXPENSES ASSOCIATED
WITH DOUBLING AMOUNT OF TIME ALLOCATED TO EXAMINERS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Number of
Annual
Reviews
Completed
by
Examiners

Expected
Number of
PTAB
Challenges
Arising from
Annual Reviews

Estimated
Decrease in
Number of PTAB
Challenges from
Doubling
Examination Hours

Estimated
Decrease in PTAB
Challenge Costs
from Doubling
Examination
Hours

430,056

378

272

$123,080,000

The structure of this Table parallels that of Table 3. Data on PTAB challenge costs
are likewise from the 2015 Annual Survey of the AIPLA.

Finally, we emphasize that the estimates of PTAB litigation
savings focus only on the costs of defending and bringing a PTAB
challenge. They do not include the costs to the Patent Office itself in
employing PTAB judges and associated staff. Conceivably, with a
substantial reduction in PTAB challenges stemming from the
hypothesized doubling of examination time, the Patent Office could
save further personnel resources.
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B. Possible Prosecution Savings to Patent Applicants
The second possible savings associated with increasing
examiner time allocations is a decrease in prosecution expenses to
patent applicants.108 In contrast to the litigation savings above, it is
theoretically ambiguous whether giving patent examiners more time
will lead to a decrease in costs incurred by the prosecuting attorneys
(and hence patent applicants).
Increasing the time allocations of patent examiners could result
in examiners making clearer and better thought out rejections, which
in turn could enable the prosecuting attorney to either more quickly
obtain a patent grant or determine that the application should be
abandoned because it fails to meet the patentability standards. Because
the patent examination process involves a back and forth between the
patent examiner and the prosecuting attorney, it is possible that
improved examination could decrease the number of rounds of review
at the Patent Office, resulting in a financial savings to the patent
applicant. Our prior empirical work lends some support to the
contention that if a patent examiner makes an initial low-quality
rejection, which our evidence suggests examiners often do under time
pressures near deadlines, this low-quality rejection will increase the
time an application is under review at the Patent Office and result in
additional rounds of review.109 In short, when examiners make quick,
low-quality rejections in early rounds of review in order to meet
deadlines—rejections that are nonfinal in nature—they will need to
make up for these initial low-quality rejections in later rounds. The
implication is that time pressures may cause examiners to waste
rounds of review.
On the other hand, increasing the time allocations of patent
examiners is likely to result in a more rigorous examination in which
better, more comprehensive rejections are made. It is possible that as
the quality of examination increases, it will require prosecuting
attorneys to spend more time responding to these rejections, which may
generate added social costs not potential savings. This may be
especially true if patent examiners begin making more complicated or
108. This Section concludes that doubling examiner time allocations results in potential
savings rather than increased patent prosecution expenses. Nevertheless, we elect to discuss the
effect of increasing examiner time allocations on patent prosecution expenses in Section II.B
because, as discussed above, the theoretical relationship is unclear and because Lemley believed
they were a cost. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1497.
109. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Procrastination in the Workplace: Evidence
from the U.S. Patent Office 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24159, 2018).
In the Online Appendix, we spell out in greater detail the essence behind the prediction that
greater examination time may lead to fewer rounds of review. Online Appendix, supra note 9.
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complex rejections, such as obviousness rejections that include a large
number of prior art references.110
As such, there may be some reason to think that prosecution
costs will go down and some reason to think they will go up by giving
examiners more time. Accordingly, we attempt to provide empirical
insight into this question. Our empirical inquiry will consist of two
parts, each bearing on the points raised in the above conceptual
discussion: (1) we will explore whether more examination time can
eliminate some degree of the unproductive back and forth between
examiners and prosecutors and diminish the number of rounds of
review (also known as “office actions”) and (2) we will explore whether
more examination time leads to more complex rejections in a given
round of review and hence increased per-office-action expenses.
We test the first question directly. The methodology underlying
our approach is essentially identical to that employed in Section II.A,
which discusses litigation savings. In short, that design follows
examiners throughout promotions that reduce the amount of time they
have to review applications and observes the impacts of such timereducing promotions on the number of rounds of reviews associated
with the application (all while controlling for other factors that may
correlate with these promotions and with the various application
outcomes—e.g., years of examiner experience). In the Online Appendix,
we further discuss the challenges associated with this exercise and
some robustness checks that we undertake in the face of these
challenges.111 All told, this empirical exercise provides no evidence to
support any claim that greater examination time leads to a greater
number of rounds of review. In fact, the evidence is consistent with the
above prediction that greater examination time may lead to fewer
wasted rounds of review.
In our preferred specification, we find that doubling examination
time is associated with 0.56 fewer rounds of review per application,
110. We note, however, that one may not necessarily expect prosecution costs to increase
substantially following examiner time increases in that the vast majority of costs of obtaining a
patent are associated with drafting of the initial application, which are fixed at the time of filing.
AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 30–31 (preparing and filing an original application of
minimal complexity has a median legal charge of $7,000 whereas preparing and filing a response
to an office action has a median legal charge of $2,000; preparing and filing an original application
in the field of biotechnology and chemistry has a median legal charge of $10,000 whereas preparing
and filing a response to an office action has a median legal charge of $3,200; preparing and filing
an original application in the field of electrical and computer technology has a median legal charge
of $10,000 whereas preparing and filing a response to an office action has a median legal charge
of $3,000; preparing and filing an original application in the mechanical field has a median legal
charge of $8,500 whereas preparing and filing a response to an office action has a median legal
charge of $2,800).
111. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 13–18.
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implying that greater examination time may cut prosecution expenses
to the extent that greater time leads to less back and forth between
examiners and applicants. The approximate savings implied by these
estimates are considerable. To derive these estimated savings, the
analysis assumes that all rounds of review are of modest complexity,
parallel to that of mechanical fields, an assumption (per Table 5) that
suggests a cost of $2,500 per round. In light of (1) this cost, (2) the
estimated reduction of 0.56 rounds, and (3) the fact that the Patent
Office disposes of roughly 430,000 applications per year, these elements
suggest that the patent system may experience upward of $602 million
savings per year in reduced prosecution expenses in connection with
doubling examination time. We acknowledge that this aggregate
estimate assumes that costs per round of review remain flat in
connection with changes in time allocations.
It is of course important to look beyond the decreased rounds of
review and examine whether an expansion in examination time may
lead to increased costs per round of review. To confront this second
question, we conduct a simple empirical exercise in which we attempt
to provide a rough estimate of increased prosecution expenses per office
action stemming from an increase in time allocations. Should the
complexity of rejections that prosecutors must respond to increase, it is
possible that prosecutors would increase their per-office-action fees in
response. To test this, we exploit the fact that the Patent Office
increased the time allocations to all patent examiners by two hours in
2010—representing a roughly 12% increase in time.112 By looking at the
reported fees charged by patent attorneys for prosecuting patent
applications immediately before 2010 and then shortly thereafter, we
can attempt to identify whether an increase in time allocations of this
magnitude resulted in increased prosecuting fees. The AIPLA reports
the median charges for patent services every two years based on a
survey of its members,113 Table 5 reproduces the median attorney’s fees
associated with responding to a patent examiner’s rejection in 2008,
2010, and 2012 for a variety of technologies and by complexity of
application.

112. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at online app. at 2.
113. AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 1.
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TABLE 5: MEDIAN CHARGES FOR SERVICES:
U.S. UTILITY PATENTS114
APPLICATION
AMENDMENT/ARGUMENT

2008

2010

2012

$1,850

$1,800

$1,800

$3,200

$3,000

$3,000

Relatively complex—
electrical/computer

$3,000

$3,000

$3,000

Relatively complex—
mechanical

$2,500

$2,500

$2,500

complexity115

Minimal
Relatively complex—
biotechnology/chemical

Notably, the attorney’s fees associated with responding to a
patent examiner’s rejection stayed flat or decreased from 2008 to 2012.
Thus, it does not appear that the Patent Office’s 2010 two-hour increase
in time allocations increased the legal charges associated with
prosecuting a given round of review. This natural experiment is, of
course, not perfect. There are certainly other factors that may impact
the legal charges associated with prosecuting a patent, potentially
confounding this analysis.116 For instance, changes in the legal market
(i.e., law firm mergers) or economic conditions could artificially depress
legal charges associated with prosecuting patents during this time
period, which may otherwise mask increases in prosecution costs
stemming from increased examination time. We note, however, that
median litigation costs for patent infringement were also constant
during this time period.117 Thus, if one thought that changes in the legal
market or economic conditions were artificially depressing legal charges
associated with prosecuting patents during our time of inquiry, then
one might expect to see corresponding changes in litigation costs for
patent infringement. Ultimately, this exercise tends to support that an

114. See id. at 30–31.
115. A “minimal complexity” patent application is defined as an application that has a tenpage specification and ten claims. Id. at 5.
116. It is also possible that attorney’s fees do not scale linearly with the time allocations of
patent examiners. That is, a modest increase of two hours in time allocations may not result in
any additional legal charges, but, for instance, doubling the time an examiner spends reviewing a
patent application could have an impact on attorney’s fees. Even if this is the case, it is important
to note that the vast majority of the legal costs associated with prosecuting a patent application
are associated with the initial drafting of the patent application. Id. at 30.
117. Id. at 41.
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increase in examiner time allocations does not lead to notable increases
in prosecution expenses.118
Given the limitations of the natural experiment for testing the
effect of time allocations on costs per round of review119 and given the
methodological concerns raised in the Online Appendix surrounding the
estimated 0.56 effect,120 we elect to take a conservative approach and
heavily discount this $602 million savings estimate. In particular, for
the purposes of the cost-benefit calculation at the heart of this Article,
we conservatively assume that these savings are half as large as this
estimate. As such, this Article proceeds with an estimated savings in
prosecution costs of $301 million per year.
C. Other Savings from Investing More in Ex Ante
Patent Examination
Section II.A provides estimates of litigation savings—both in
federal courts and in PTAB challenges—that would result from the
Patent Office issuing fewer invalid patents in response to doubling
patent examiner time allocations and Section II.B provides estimates of
prosecution savings associated with doubling examiner time
allocations. Of course, invalid patents impose costs on society beyond
wasteful litigation expenses. Most fundamentally, improvidently
granted patents can result in supracompetitive pricing due to the
exclusionary power provided by patent protection. This in turn may
price individuals out of the relevant market, including individuals that
would value the product more than the cost of production. While society
may accept such consequences for a properly issued patent in return for
the notion that such profits were necessary to induce innovation in the
first place, an invalid patent imposes these costs on society without
providing the commensurate benefits.121 For instance, the promise of a
patent is not needed to induce the development of technology that is not
new. As such, under proper application of the patentability standards,
patent applications on such technologies should be denied patent
protection.
118. We note that our analysis assumes that practicing attorneys would be able to monetize
their greater efforts by increasing the legal charges associated with prosecuting patent
applications. While fixed-fee arrangements may initially dampen efforts to do so, if greater
examiner time allocations do lead to greater levels of time and effort by applicant’s attorneys,
increases in fixed-fee levels would be possible over time as new client and/or fee relationships are
established.
119. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
120. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 5–9.
121. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 817 (2012).
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Of course, the costs of invalid patents extend beyond those
simply related to monopoly-driven deadweight losses. Invalid patents
can also be utilized by non-practicing entities or patent trolls to
opportunistically extract licensing fees from innovators122 and inhibit
the ability of startups to obtain venture capital.123 Erroneously issued
patents can also impede competitors from entering markets124 and stunt
follow-on research.125 These harms, however, are very difficult to
quantify.
Take, for example, follow-on innovation, for which two recent,
notable papers have provided insight on the effect of patents on
cumulative innovative efforts.126 Because a given discovery may be
utilized as an input in later follow-on discoveries, nearly all innovation
is cumulative in nature. If a patent is issued to an invention that fails
to meet the patentability standards, the invalid patent could act to
curtail follow-on efforts by blocking other innovators from using the
invention associated with the invalid patent as an input to subsequent
innovation. In the first of these two recent papers, Alberto Galasso and
Mark Schankerman study the cumulative impacts patents may have on
innovation by exploring the consequences following the invalidation of
a patent by a court.127 Under this approach, they find that patents
impede follow-on innovation but only in very specific scenarios. For
instance, they find that patent invalidations have a significant impact
on cumulative innovation only in the fields of computers and
communications, electronics, and medical instruments (including
biotechnology)—they find no effect for drugs, chemicals, or mechanical
technologies.128 Additionally, they show that the effects of patent rights
122. James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST:
THE SWITCH (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/thepatent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis [https://perma.cc/3RVS-JRJ3] (noting that
patents are generally overly broad and vaguely worded).
123. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 8 (“The threat of being sued for infringement
by an incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital
financing.” (quoting public comment of Joshua Lerner, Professor, Harvard Business School)).
124. See id. at 3 (noting that allowing patents on obvious inventions can thwart competition);
Leslie, supra note 61, at 119–25 (“[A] new entrant concerned about infringing an existing patent
must pay to investigate the patent’s scope and validity . . . [which poses] a barrier to entry . . . .”).
125. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 62, at 698; Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 32 (noting that
overly broad patent protection “can lead to deficient incentives to develop second generation
products”).
126. See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Casual
Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317 (2015); Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How
Do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21666.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5BQ-SQJQ].
127. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 126.
128. Id. at 321–22.
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on later innovation depend critically on the characteristics of the
transacting parties.129 Their entire findings are driven by one specific
scenario: the number of small innovators increases when patents by
large firms are invalidated.130 While Galasso and Schankerman provide
compelling empirical evidence on the heterogeneous nature of patent
invalidation on cumulative innovation, they are also careful to
emphasize that their paper involves the judicial removal of an existing
patent right.131 As they note, there are some conceptual differences
between this scenario and when patents are never granted in the first
place, which could limit the generalizability of their findings to the issue
in this Article—quantifying the potential gains associated with the
Patent Office issuing fewer invalid patents.132
In the second of these recent papers, Bhaven Sampat and Heidi
Williams examine the extent to which patents on human genes affect
follow-on scientific research and product development.133 Sampat and
Williams estimate that patents on human genes have largely a
negligible effect on follow-on innovation, echoing the corresponding
findings of Galasso and Schankerman in the relevant technological
area.134 All told, there is some evidence that issuing invalid patents may
impede future innovative efforts, but this impediment may be limited
to certain technological fields.
As such, it is possible that we could reduce some social harms
related to an inhibition of follow-on innovation to the extent that we
eliminate invalid patents. Of course, it is critical to keep in mind that
both the Patent Office and the courts are tasked with eliminating
invalid patents. Hypothetically speaking, if the courts could
immediately invalidate all invalid patents issued by the Patent Office,
society would perhaps not experience any of the hypothesized harms of
invalid patent issuances (other than the costs of litigation itself). In this
hypothetical scenario, increasing ex ante review at the Patent Office
would thus not result in any savings (beyond reduced litigation costs).
In practice, however, the courts do not operate this perfectly. After all,
by relying on private enforcement, it is not guaranteed that a litigation
system will have the opportunity to assess the validity of all invalid
patents that are issued, especially in light of extensive litigation costs.
Accordingly, if the courts were to fail to invalidate a patent that is

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sampat & Williams, supra note 126.
Id. (manuscript at 29).
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substantially impeding follow-on innovation, such harms could indeed
be saved to the extent that society invested in stronger ex ante review
at the Patent Office to target these bad patents.
Courts are also imperfect in their timing. Courts may, at some
point, get around to invalidating a bad patent; however, notable delay
may take place before this occurs. In the interim, invalid patents may
have the opportunity to inflict these various harms on society—e.g.,
stalling follow-on innovation. As such, by investing more at the Patent
Office and knocking out these invalid patents earlier, we may generate
additional savings for society.
Acknowledging the possible mechanisms by which greater ex
ante investments could reduce the harms associated with invalid
patents, the question then becomes how large are these harms? And
how do we quantify them to add to the litigation savings estimates
discussed in Section II.A and the prosecution savings estimates
discussed in Section II.B? These are substantial questions in need of
considerable additional research. While Galasso and Schankerman and
Sampat and Williams both studied the impacts of patents on follow-on
innovation, neither attempted to quantify the associated welfare
impacts. We are also unaware of reliable estimates of the deadweight
losses associated with patent-induced monopoly pricing, specifically
during the period of time between patent issuance and court
invalidation. Given the complexities involved with estimating the
corresponding savings associated with these other costs, we have
elected to focus our simulation analysis on the calculations over
potential savings in litigation, PTAB, and prosecution expenses.
III. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASING RESOURCES TO
THE PATENT OFFICE
The previous Part calculated the potential savings associated
with doubling patent examiner time allocations. Of course, this is only
half of the puzzle. In order to determine whether society would be better
off devoting more resources to the Patent Office to increase the quality
of examination, we must also know the costs associated with doubling
the time examiners review patent applications. This Part turns to this
task.
Given the hourly costs of employing examiners, increasing the
time allocations for reviewing patent applications will result in an
increase in the average costs associated with evaluating patent
applications. The overall costs incurred by the Patent Office depend on
how the Agency responds to its decision to give examiners more time to
review individual applications. If the Agency’s budget is fixed—i.e., the
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Patent Office is not able to increase its operating budget in the face of
a doubling of per-application review time—it would necessarily have to
reduce the number of applications it processes to ensure its expenses do
not exceed its revenue. Given that total, Agency spending would not
change in this scenario. The aggregate social costs associated with this
approach would largely stem from the harms to patent applicants from
having to endure longer waiting periods before the Patent Office begins
examining their applications.135 The costs to the Patent Office itself
would largely stem from reputational harms associated with having a
growing backlog of patent applications. Alternatively, if the Patent
Office could increase its operating budget, then it would maintain its
examination capacity while concomitantly providing examiners with
additional time to complete more thorough reviews of all applications.
Obviously, it would be difficult to do so with its existing workforce given
the finite number of hours in a day. This alternative scenario thus
necessarily involves the need to hire an additional group of examiners.
As a result, the cost to the Patent Office associated with this approach
is primarily the personnel expenses stemming from the need to hire and
pay additional patent examiners.
If the Agency is committed to expanding examination time
allotments, we suggest that it would prefer the latter to the former for
several reasons. First, the Agency is under tremendous pressure to
continue to decrease its voluminous backlog of patent applications.136
The Patent Office has cut its backlog of patent applications from a high
of over 760,000 in 2007 to just under 570,000 in 2017.137 Given that the
Patent Office has identified that its single biggest challenge is to
decrease its patent pendency—that is, the time between filing a patent
application and receiving substantive communication regarding its

135. A backlog of patent applications may impose a variety of costs, including “the reduction
in value of patent protection for patent applicants; a reduction in the incentive to innovate and
undertake research and development; granting of monopoly power to non-patentable applications
(through longer pending patent rights); deterring use of the patent system; and the diversion of
resources away from productive activities.” LONDON ECON., ECONOMIC STUDY ON PATENT
BACKLOGS AND A SYSTEM OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 58 (2010), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-backlogreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET7P-PHRH]. This report estimates that the cost to the global
economy of one extra year of delays at the United States, European, and Japanese patent offices
is $7.6 billion. Id. at viii.
136. Top Management Challenges Facing the Department of Commerce in FY 2013: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Todd Zinser, Inspector Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce) (noting that addressing patent backlog is one of the top challenges facing the
Department of Commerce).
137. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 170 tbl.3.
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patentability from the Agency138—it seems unlikely that the Agency
would be inclined to diminish its patent processing capacity. Second,
the Patent Office has the authority, in effect, to increase its budget
without having to lobby Congress for additional funds. The Agency is
user-fee funded and has the ability to set its fees by rulemaking.139 The
Agency’s budget is generally set to the Patent Office’s projected fee
income for a given year.140 As a result, by augmenting the fees it charges
patent applicants, the Patent Office can increase its budget to
accommodate the additional expenses.141
Thus, this Article proceeds by assuming the Patent Office would
choose to maintain its examination production level in the face of
mounting patent review expenses. Given this assumption, the costs
associated with increased patent examiner time allocations will
primarily be the personnel expenses associated with hiring and paying
additional patent examiners. What are the personnel costs associated
with doubling the amount of time extended to examiners to review
applications? To determine these expenses, we conduct a

138. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 33 (2008), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2008PAR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8U8P-3NXH] (noting the PTO’s “biggest challenge is to address the growth of
pendency and the backlog of patent applications waiting to be examined”); Inspector General’s Top
Management Challenges Facing the USPTO, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://web.
archive.org/web/20121010172423/http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/oai_01.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/J9F7-GMKW] (noting the management challenge of
reducing the patent application backlog); see also Jon W. Dudas, Message from the Under Secretary
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of USPTO: Fighting Piracy and Counterfeiting
by Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 2, 2005),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130425173504/http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/
2005/02_message_director.jsp [https://perma.cc/DPY4-XWNU] (noting that the “volume and
complexity of patent applications continues to outpace current capacity to examine them” and the
PTO has “backlog of historic proportions”).
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012); Final Rule Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg.
4,212, 4,224 tbl.4 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1, 41, 42). Since 1991, the Agency
has funded its operations almost entirely through user fees. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388. The Patent Office’s budget in 1991 was
over $370 million, of which $3 million were from general revenue funds. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 97, at 1–2.
Of course, alternatively, the Patent Office could lobby Congress to increase its budget through
funding the Agency in part through tax revenues. However, mounting concern regarding deficit
containment as well as Congress’s past track record of utilizing the Patent Office’s fees to fund
other governmental activities (even when the Agency’s financial sustainability was in question)
suggests this is unlikely to be successful.
140. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67,
76–77 (2013).
141. Id. at 76–80 (describing the Patent Office’s budgetary process). Moreover, the limitation
that the Agency can only set its fees so that, in the aggregate, its fees cover its expenses would in
no way limit the Agency’s ability to modify its fees to cover the additional examination expenses.
See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (codifying patent fees).
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straightforward accounting exercise in Table 6. We begin by considering
the 430,056 regular utility applications142 disposed of by the Patent
Office in 2016, breaking down those applications into the GS-levels of
the associated examiners. In light of the average number of hours
allocated to the various GS-levels, we then determine for each GS-level
the number of additional hours the Agency would need to fund in order
to double the amount of time extended to each application. We then
multiply these hours by the costs per hour to employ patent examiners
at the various GS-levels. Where such costs account for the relevant
salary at that GS-level in addition to a range of related costs—such as
fringe benefits, office expenses, and equipment—we make various
conservative assumptions to account for these supplementary
expenses.143 Overall, using 2016 figures, this exercise suggests that
142. By “regular,” we mean excluding provisional applications and applications filed under the
Patent Cooperation Treaty.
143. To determine the hourly costs, we start by considering hourly salaries across GS-levels
(beginning with GS-level 5) from 2016. General Schedule (GS) Payscale Table for 2016,
FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www.federalpay.org/gs/2016 (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
X6ES-QCV7]. Of course, the full cost of an employee to an organization exceeds their base salary.
Account must be made for fringe benefits, employer taxes and insurance, and allotments for office
space, rent, equipment, replacement and turnover costs, managerial support, and other such costs.
The Patent Office does not report these costs for a marginal employee hour. Nonetheless, we
researched accounting practices for determining the indirect costs of employee time for
organizations that we thought would be comparable in nature (in terms of employee tasks) to the
Patent Office—i.e., organizations contracting with the federal government where such
organizations need to account for the costs of employee effort to be able to develop governmental
bids. Deltek surveys government contracting agencies for these purposes and reports average
indirect costs in a recent study. See DELTEK CLARITY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING INDUSTRY
STUDY (2018), http://more.deltek.com/gc-clarity-2018?sourceid=19&utm_source=blogs&utm_
medium=website&utm_campaign=GovConBlog&cmp=website_blogs_ClarityGovConToplineResu
lts [https://perma.cc/643K-DSTG]. Deltek reports average fringe-benefit costs of twenty-eight
percent, average general and administrative expense rates of fifteen percent, and an average
composite overhead expense rate of thirty-nine percent. Id. at 26. These numbers imply that the
full cost of employee time is roughly 2.04 times (1.28 × 1.15 × 1.39) an employee’s base salary. See
id.; see also Hyam Singer, Don’t Be Fooled: Calculate the Real Cost of Employees and
Consultants, TOPTAL, https://www.toptal.com/freelance/don-t-be-fooled-the-real-cost-of-employeesand-consultants (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TR4R-SBRF] (calculating a multiple
of 1.99 based on a prior Deltek report). There may be reason to believe that the relevant multiplier
in the case of the Patent Office is lower than this amount. After all, the vast majority of patent
examiners employed by the Agency telecommute from their homes, saving considerable overhead
costs. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 91, 94. Nonetheless, to be conservative,
we select a multiplier implied by the Deltek averages.
The Patent Office conducted a regulatory impact analysis with respect to rulemaking to set
and adjust patent fees that are economically significant in 2013. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: SETTING AND ADJUSTING PATENT FEES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 10 OF THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (Jan. 18, 2013),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/AC54_Final_Regulatory_Impact_An
alysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4ZX-D9N5]. In this analysis, the Agency estimated that hiring 1,500
additional patent examiners would cost the Patent Office $154 million in terms of “long-term cost
of compensation and benefits in the out years.” Id. at 53. This would suggest a multiplier of
approximately 1.3, assuming the distribution of patent examiners in Table 6.
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doubling the amount of time extended to examiners will cost the Agency
$660 million per year.
TABLE 6: SIMULATED INCREASE IN PAYROLL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED
WITH DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINERS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Number of
Annual
Dispositions
by
Examiners
237

Mean
Number
of Hours
Assigned
36.3

Total
Additional
Hours After
Doubling
Hours per
Application
8,603

Examiner
Cost per
Hour (Salary,
Benefits, and
Other Costs)
$31.41

Extra Costs
When Doubling
Examination
Hours
$270,200

GS-7
GS-9

3,244
9,870

28.7
26.0

93,103
256.620

$38.90
$47.57

$3,621,325
$12,207,762

GS-11
GS-12

20,770

23.5

488,095

$57.58

$28,102,895

41,825

21.5

899,238

$68.99

$62,041,828

GS-13

85,747
254,931

18.2
16.3

1,560,595
4,155,375

$82.05
$96.96

$128,043,432
$402,920,694

12,432

16.5

205,128

$114.05

$23,394,541

430,056

17.9

7,666,757

$76.58

$660,602,677

GS-level
GS-5

GS-14
GS-15
Total

The mean number of hours per GS-level is calculated over the 2016 Patent
Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) sample after assigning hour allotments
to each application in the PAIR database based on the associated technology group
and examiner GS-level.

IV. THE PATENT OFFICE IS IRRATIONALLY IGNORANT
This Part summarizes our empirical findings from Parts II and
III and compares the potential savings and costs associated with
doubling patent examiner time allocations. Because the litigation and
prosecution savings associated with increasing the Patent Office
resources outweigh the costs associated with increasing the examiner’s
time allocations, we conclude that society would be better off investing
more resources ex ante in the review of patent applications. That is to
say, we conclude the opposite of Lemley. Given its current level of
resources, the Patent Office is not being “rationally ignorant” but,
instead, irrationally ignorant. This Part closes by outlining the key
differences between our findings and Lemley’s, noting that Lemley’s
assumptions understated the potential savings and overstated the
potential costs associated with doubling patent examiner time
allocations.
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A. The Patent Office Resources Should Be Increased
To summarize our empirical analysis, we simulate that by
doubling the amount of hours allocated to review applications, the
amount of additional costs to the Agency will be roughly $660 million
annually. We estimate federal litigation savings of $491 million and
PTAB litigation savings of $112 million. We also estimate that
increasing examiner time allocations will result in $301 million in
savings in prosecution expenses to the patent applicant, driven by
decreased rounds of reviews at the Patent Office. Though the $660
million increase in costs is significant, this amount is still exceeded by
the $904 million that may be saved annually in (1) expenses covering
litigation in federal court, (2) PTAB-related legal expenses, and
(3) potential savings in prosecution costs.144
Moreover, this excess of savings over costs would only grow if we
were able to quantify what are likely to be substantial additional social
costs stemming from the issuance of invalid patents that will either
never be invalidated in court or that will be invalidated with a delay.
The conservative nature of our comparison strategy is only
strengthened by our decision to exclude these additional savings from
our direct comparison.145
Lemley famously noted that the Patent Office is “rationally
ignorant.”146 Based on the above empirical analysis, we do not agree
with Lemley’s contention that the present state of affairs is “rational.”
On the contrary, the present degree of ignorance—that is, the limited
ability of examiners to unearth prior art and hence reject patent
applications that fail to meet the patentability standards—is irrational.
In other words, the current level of resources the Patent Office extends
to review patent applications is insufficient.

144. See supra Part II.
145. Quantifying those additional savings would become more critical if the increased
expenses associated with augmenting patent examiner time allocations were greater than the
saved litigation expenses.
146. See Lemley, supra note 3. By “ignorant,” he referred to the inability of examiners, at least
in some cases, to fully apply the patentability requirements during the limited time they were
allotted for review—e.g., their inability to discover that a claimed innovation was not, in fact,
novel. Id. at 1508–09. When looking at the present structure of the examination process, we do not
necessarily take issue with Lemley’s use of the term “ignorant.” Patent examiners indeed appear
to be allowing a notable degree of patents that would likely fail a stricter examination if examiners
were given greater resources.
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B. Key Differences Between Our Findings and Lemley’s
This Section delineates how we reach the opposite outcome than
Lemley. More specifically, we find that Lemley overstated the costs
associated with increasing patent examiner time allocations and
understated the savings associated with augmenting the time
examiners review patents.
First, Lemley assumed that if the amount of time patent
examiners spent reviewing an application was doubled, the Patent
Office would issue ten percent fewer patents.147 Based on that
assumption, Lemley then assumed that litigation costs would decrease
by ten percent if the time allocations of patent examiners were
doubled.148 Unlike Lemley, we do not simply guess a particular value
for these parameters. Rather, we draw on rich microlevel application
data and estimate an empirical model meant to isolate the relationship
between examination time allotments on the one hand and either grant
rates or reduced litigation events on the other hand. To be clear, our
analysis is not without assumptions of its own. Virtually no empirical
exercise could escape such a requirement. In our case, as we
exhaustively discuss and support in our prior peer-reviewed research
that developed these methods,149 we are assuming that the comparisons
of outcomes across applications assigned to examiners at different GSlevels indeed illuminate the effects of varying time allocations to
examiners (after accounting for the range of controls included in the
regression specification). We acknowledge that there is still room to
challenge our assumption in this regard; nonetheless, we have
endeavored with this exercise to go far beyond merely assuming the
value of the key parameter itself.
Ultimately, but perhaps not surprisingly, our estimation
approach delivers a different value for these parameters than those
assumed by Lemley. In particular, our analysis suggests that both of
Lemley’s assumed values are too low, thus downplaying the total
potential savings from greater ex ante investment in examination
review. To begin, as set forth in the Online Appendix and as
summarized in Section II.A.2, by doubling the amount of examination
hours, we predict that patent grant rates will fall by roughly 27%, not
10%, as Lemley assumed.150 For the reasons theorized above, this
reduction in patent issuances would be expected to lead to less

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 1509–10.
Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12.
See Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 4–9; see also supra Section II.A.2.
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subsequent litigation. It is also important to note that greater
examination time may improve issued patent quality in ways that are
not solely captured by a reduced grant rate—e.g., greater time may also
help examiners narrow the claim scope of patents that would have
issued either way. Perhaps due to a combination of these claimnarrowing effects and the reduced-patent-issuance effects, our
regression estimates demonstrate that a doubling of examination time
for a given application leads to a 44% reduction in the expected
litigation expenses associated with that application.
This litigation-savings estimate is considerably larger than the
ten percent effect assumed by Lemley, and that difference holds
meaningful implications for our ultimate conclusion. If we were to
replicate the litigation savings from Table 3 but use Lemley’s
assumptions, we would predict that the amount of federal litigation
savings would equal only $147 million (discounted to $126 million). This
amount, even when combined with the PTAB and prosecution savings,
would no longer exceed the $660 million in necessary additional
expenditures associated with doubling examination time. Thus, at least
when focusing on our comparison of institutional costs—litigation,
PTAB, and prosecution savings versus agency administrative
expenses—we reach a different conclusion from Lemley, in part, due to
our ability to actually estimate the degree of litigation savings ensuing
from a doubling of examination hours.
Another notable difference between our calculation and
Lemley’s stems from differences in our respective estimates of the effect
of augmenting examiner time allocations on patent prosecution legal
charges. Lemley assumed (without estimating) that doubling the time
examiners review patent applications will result in a fifty percent
increase in legal fees associated with prosecuting patents.151 He
reasoned that because patent examiners will have more time for review,
they will find more prior art and make more rejections, in which event
the responding attorney will need to spend more time reviewing and
responding to the additional rejections.152 Lemley set the costs
associated with prosecuting an original patent application at $20,000
(and a repeat-filed application at $5,000), meaning that for each
original application filed it would cost $10,000 more to prosecute (and
for a repeat-filed application, an additional $2,500).153 Because
currently over 430,000 applications are disposed of annually, of which

151. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1508.
152. Id. at 1508 n.7.
153. Id. at 1508.
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approximately 40% are repeat filers,154 the increased legal charges
associated with doubling time allocations under Lemley’s assumption
are just over $3 billion (assuming no inflation in prosecution costs).155
If Lemley’s assumption regarding prosecution costs is correct, then our
ultimate conclusion would change. But we believe that this amount
vastly overestimates the increased legal fees associated with
augmenting patent examiner time allocations. In fact, our estimate
suggests these fees are in the wrong direction altogether.
Although we agree that examiners may make higher-quality
rejections if given more time to review patent applications, as discussed
in Section II.B, it is theoretically unclear whether this would increase
or decrease the aggregate legal fees associated with prosecuting
patents. The empirical evidence set forth in Section II.B suggests a
large potential savings in these fees. More specifically, we find there is
little change in per-office-action fees resulting from an increase in time
allocations, lending little support to the supposition that prosecution
rates would increase. Most saliently, our findings that the number of
rounds of review would likely decrease upon augmenting examiner time
allocations supports the notion that patent applicants could experience
substantial savings—not costs—due to stronger ex ante investment in
the Patent Office. In particular, we estimate that doubling examiner
time allocations would result in a $301 million savings to patent
prosecution legal fees.
V. OBJECTIONS
This Part begins by addressing objections to the calculations laid
out in Parts II through IV. Some might question the costs and savings

154. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 627 (noting that forty percent of applications filed
in 2012 were repeat filings).
155. Technically, Lemley assumed patent application filings would decrease by ten percent in
response to enhanced examination at the Patent Office. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1509. Thus, his
estimated prosecution costs would be $2.7 billion, not $3 billion. See id. Either way, if Lemley’s
assumption regarding increased prosecution costs is correct, our ultimate conclusion would be
altered.
On this point, in our own estimates of the amount of litigation savings and additional personnel
expenses stemming from doubling examination hours, we do not assume that the number of
annual dispositions will fall as a result of additional ex ante investment in the Patent Office. What
if we were to assume, as Lemley did, that applications will fall by ten percent in the process? First,
recall that the number of annual application dispositions by the Patent Office is a key direct input
into our estimates of both the costs and savings of investing more in the Patent Office, as discussed
in Parts II and III. Scaling that input down by ten percent will, in turn, scale down both sides of
our fundamental comparison. Accordingly, this assumption will only affect the size of the
differential between costs and savings that we predict, not the direction of that differential.
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we choose to incorporate while others might argue that the focus on
legal costs fails to account for distributional effects.
A. Failure to Account for a Full Range of Costs and Benefits
We do not, and cannot possibly, account for all the costs and
savings associated with increasing patent examiner review times. We
noted this previously when indicating our inability to quantify the
additional savings that may arise from reduced deadweight losses from
monopoly pricing, reduced harms to follow-on innovation, and other
such factors. Given the lack of relevant empirical data on these other
savings, we have chosen to take a conservative approach by considering
only litigation and prosecution savings. In contrast, the estimate of
costs associated with increasing examiner time allocations is more
comprehensive and more likely to include the full range of costs. Our
limited ability to consider potential savings does not affect our
conclusion that the Patent Office is irrationally ignorant. If the
litigation and prosecution savings alone justify spending more
resources at the Patent Office, considering the full range of savings
would only make the case more compelling.
Although we are more confident that our estimation of potential
costs is more comprehensive than our estimation of potential savings,
admittedly, we, like Lemley, only consider first-order costs and savings
associated with increasing examiner time allocations. There are
undoubtedly second-order costs and savings associated with giving
examiners more time to do their jobs. By second-order, we refer to
subsequent effects that may arise in response to the effects of timeallocation increases already discussed.
Many second-order effects, however, are difficult to quantify
even with empirical guidance. For instance, the Patent Office may need
to increase its fees in an effort to fund the increased personnel expenses
set forth in Part III. Higher examination fees could result in the filing
of fewer patent applications. On the one hand, fewer filings could be a
reflection of less underlying innovation. The added cost associated with
receiving a patent on a new invention—as a result of the heightened
fees—may induce an innovator to forgo pursuing that invention in the
first place. On the other hand, it may be the case that the foregone
invention is of dubious legal merit anyway—e.g., perhaps what is
foregone are efforts to develop a technology that is already known to the
world. To the extent that increased Patent Office fees discourage
innovative efforts of this more dubious nature, the result may be one
that enhances social welfare. There is some support from economic
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theory that increases in fees would first impact these less
groundbreaking innovations.156
Other secondary effects are even more difficult to quantify. For
instance, companies sued for patent litigation must often involve
scientists and researchers in their litigation efforts—e.g., to participate
in depositions and to provide litigation support—which can crowd out
their research and development efforts.157 Of course, while these
research-related effects may be difficult to quantify, were we to
incorporate them, it would only increase our estimated savings levels
and thus reinforce our analysis. Alternatively but relatedly, the costs
associated with hiring additional patent examiners could be larger than
we suggested. Because a scientific degree is necessary to become a
patent examiner, examiners are almost always trained scientists and
engineers. Is society better off placing scientists in private companies
to work on innovations or in the Patent Office to review applications?
This is a difficult question, which, at least today, is nearly
impossible to answer.158 Nonetheless, given the litany of conservative
assumptions we have made along the way and the theoretical ambiguity
as to whether these second-order considerations will increase or
decrease the net savings to society, we have little reason to believe that

156. Mark Schankerman & Florian Schuett, Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees,
and the Courts (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2016-036, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885197 [https://perma.cc/7M2Z-GR75].
As a result, if we were to incorporate a consideration of the effect of Patent Office fee changes
into our cost-benefit analysis, the result could either strengthen or weaken our ultimate
conclusion. Nonetheless, studies to date have suggested that small increases to patentexamination fees have a negligible effect on the volume of patent filings. See Gaetan de
Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand for
Patents, 74 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 58, 58–77 (2011); Timothy K. Wilson, Patent Demand—
A Simple Path to Patent Reform, 2 INT’L IN-HOUSE COUNSEL J. 806, 810–12 (2008) (arguing that
filing fees need to be raised significantly in order to reach the elastic portion of the demand curve).
Accordingly, even if fee levels increased to accommodate the required personnel expenses, it is not
clear that we would see a meaningful change in applicant behavior in the first place. Given this
empirical insight from the existing literature on the elasticity of applicant behavior to fee levels,
we have elected not to model these effects altogether.
157. Stephen Kiebzak, Greg Rafert & Catherine E. Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and
Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity (June 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457611
[https://perma.cc/2JWL-TGVH]
(finding a U-shaped relationship between U.S. venture capital investment and the number of
litigated patents).
158. Despite this difficulty, we acknowledge the possibility of observing productivity and/or
innovation declines elsewhere in society as a result of increasing the Patent Office workforce. But
it is important to keep in mind that by expanding the personnel capacity of the Patent Office, we
are likely to improve the quality and the efficiency of the patent examination process. This may
only increase the returns to patenting and to innovative activity, which may, in turn, attract more
individuals into science and research in the first place. Given both the theoretical ambiguity in the
direction of any such effect and the difficulty in estimating these responses, we accordingly do not
incorporate them into our cost-benefit comparison.
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our failure to account for these second-order effects will alter the
ultimate implications of our analysis.159
B. Distributional Effects
This Article has not yet discussed any distributional
considerations associated with the fundamental question of whether we
should rely more on ex ante screening or ex post litigation for patent
invalidation purposes. Stated more generally, we have not yet
addressed the question of who in society should bear the marginal costs
associated with screening valid from invalid patents. The costs involved
are, of course, not trivial, and the benefits that derive from the
screening of valid from invalid patents are felt by the general public.
For both of these reasons, it may enhance both equity and efficiency if
the costs associated with screening invalid patents were to be spread
across a large base, rather than being concentrated on a small group of
individuals in society.160
159. Moreover, even if we were to double the number of examiners at the Patent Office, this
would only entail the hiring of an additional eight thousand individuals. This is perhaps trivial
next to the size of the overall workforce employed as either scientists or engineers in the United
States. For instance, consider the number of people employed in the following positions in the
United States in 2016: chemical engineers (32,700), electrical and electronics engineers (324,600),
civil engineers (303,500), mechanical engineers (288,800), industrial engineers (257,900),
environmental engineers (53,800), computer hardware engineers (73,600), nuclear engineers
(17,700), petroleum engineers (33,700), aerospace engineers (69,600), biomedical engineers
(21,300), medical scientists (120,000), biochemists and biophysicists (31,500), microbiologists
(23,200), agricultural and food scientists (43,000), computer and information research scientists
(27,900), chemists and materials scientists (96,200), environmental scientists and specialists
(89,500), geoscientists (32,000), physicists and astronomers (19,900), and atmospheric scientists
(10,400), among others. For these statistics and more information regarding workforce size, see
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh (last modified April 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CE69-57RX].
160. Basic economic theory suggests that, generally, the more one loads the financing of a
public good onto one source—e.g., through taxation—the higher the extent of deadweight losses
stemming from the necessary taxation. It is generally more efficient to spread those financing
burdens more broadly. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 204–08 (5th
ed. 1993). Moreover, this outcome would likely align with considerations of equity to the extent
that we see a greater correspondence between the group of individuals benefiting from this policy
and the group of individuals financing this policy.
An assumption that we have made thus far in this discussion is that the public at large is
indeed the group that benefits from a proper screening of valid from invalid patents. But is that
assumption altogether clear? After all, it is undeniable that patent owners are the primary
beneficiaries of obtaining a patent. They may be able to charge monopoly prices for their invention,
reaping significant rents during the period of the exclusivity. At the same time, the patent system’s
primary goal is to promote innovation, and society, not just the patent applicant, benefits from the
fruits of such innovation. Without a mechanism such as the patent system to recoup their research
and development expenses, innovators may choose not to innovate at all, which would be
unquestionably bad for society. Moreover, once this system is in place, society at large stands to
lose should patent protection be extended to invalid patents, in which event society gains from
investing greater resources to ensure that these determinations are made accurately.
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One might be concerned that adopting the ex ante approach
would too narrowly focus the costs of screening invalid patents on
patent applicants. However, it may be premature to conclude that the
costs of greater ex ante investment are actually concentrated on a
smaller section of society. First, all applicants pay application (and
other) fees to the Patent Office, whereas only a small subset of those
innovators will ultimately be involved in litigation. Moreover, the full
incidence of application fees may fall on a much broader base—i.e.,
patent holders may pass those costs onto their customers via higher
prices. Finally, even if it were the case that the full incidence of the fees
paid to the Agency did not sufficiently fall on a broad enough portion of
the population, it is also important to note that a push toward greater
ex ante investment at the Patent Office could also be combined with a
retreat from full user-fee funding of the Patent Office. That is, one could
fund some amount of the additional personnel expenses needed to
expand examination time through general tax revenue—which would
be directly spread across a wide base—rather than user fees.161
All told, it is simply unclear whether one approach—ex ante
versus ex post—trumps the other from a distributional point of view.
Accordingly, even though the analysis in Parts II through IV largely
focuses on a comparison of aggregate costs and aggregate savings, we
do not believe that a consideration of distributional factors of this
nature would fundamentally alter our contention that society would
benefit from investment in greater resources devoted to patent
examination at the Patent Office.
VI. REFORM PROPOSALS
So far, this Article has focused on whether it is more efficient to
increase the time examiners spend reviewing patent applications to
weed out more bad patents or to reserve a larger role for the courts to
invalidate improvidently issued patents. We conclude that the Patent
Office should give serious thought to augmenting the time allocations
of patent examiners given that Part IV demonstrated that the benefits
161. Congress, however, would have to provide the Patent Office with a sufficient budget to
cover its growing examination demands, which is hardly a given. In the past, Congress has
routinely utilized Patent Office fees to fund other governmental activities, even when the Agency’s
resource health was in question. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 140, at 77–78. Furthermore,
mounting concerns over the federal government’s fiscal cliff suggest that funding the Agency
through taxes may not result in the Patent Office receiving sufficient resources to process its
growing backlog of patent applications. One of the primary drivers behind Congress’s increased
reliance on user fees to finance agencies has been the belief that such a funding mechanism
increases the resource sustainability of the Agency, especially in the current environment of deficit
containment.
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associated with increasing the time examiners evaluate applications
outweigh the costs. This Part provides some specifics as to how the
Agency should augment examiner time allocations.
There is a question, of course, as to how the Agency should go
about augmenting review time. Should examiners be given more time
across the board, or should the Patent Office enact a more nuanced
approach? That is, while expanding time allotments, should we also
reconsider the manner in which those allotments vary over an
examiner’s career? We argue for the latter. Instead of advocating that
the Agency should give all examiners a set increase in hours for review,
we suggest that the Agency should target its time expansion efforts
more heavily on higher GS-level examiners.
As discussed in Section I.A, our previous work found that
examiner grant rates increase by roughly 13% to 29% as an examiner
rises from GS-level 7 to GS-level 14, a progression wherein examination
times are cut in half. While decreasing hour allotments upon promotion
is prudent—after all, seasoned and proven examiners are likely to
complete a review of an application faster than an examiner who has
yet to demonstrate this competency—our prior research suggests the
rate at which the Patent Office decreases time allocations upon
examiner promotion should be reconsidered.162 Our estimates of
significantly higher grant rates upon reaching higher GS-levels suggest
that the current scaling of the time allotments upon promotion is too
aggressive and leaves applicants with an inequitable outcome.
Applicants that, by chance, happen to receive an examiner with an
aggressive time schedule (i.e., a higher GS-level), will face a much
higher likelihood of success relative to applicants that, by chance,
happen to receive an examiner with a more forgiving schedule.
As a result, we propose that the Patent Office not only give all
examiners more time to review patent applications but that the Agency
target those time expansions more heavily on the higher GS-level
examiners. In other words, the time allocations of a GS-level 12 patent
examiner reviewing applications in a given technology should be
increased more than the time allocations of a GS-level 11 patent
examiner reviewing applications in the same technology. Increasing
examiner time allocations will help improve the quality of patents
issued by the Agency. To the extent that these adjustments will create
a more homogenous pattern of grant rates across examiners, such a
change would increase the equity of the patent examination system, as
similar applicants would be more likely to have similar patent office
outcomes.
162. See supra Section I.A.
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Finally, we note that this analysis does not speak to whether
other proposals to improve Patent Office decisionmaking should be
implemented. For instance, our prior work argued that the Agency’s fee
schedule should be modified to eliminate a financial incentive to grant
patents.163 Others have proposed Patent Office reforms to increase the
clarity of issued claims.164 Still others, including us, have suggested
limiting the number of times a patent applicant can refile the same
application.165 These suggestions may be good ideas, but a separate
cost-benefit analysis must be conducted before concluding as such.
CONCLUSION
This Article confronts a classic regulatory dilemma: Should
society increase the resources at the Patent Office in an effort to
increase the quality of issued patents, or should society reserve a larger
residual role for the courts to invalidate bad patents? Mark Lemley
famously favored the latter, arguing that the costs associated with
increasing examiner time allocations outweighed the benefits of doing
so. This Article conducts a similar cost-benefit analysis to the one that
Lemley attempted over fifteen years ago, but does so by employing new
and rich sources of data along with sophisticated empirical techniques
to form novel, empirically driven estimates of relationships that Lemley
was forced, given the dearth of empirical evidence at the time, to simply
assume in his own analysis. Armed with these new estimates, this
Article demonstrates that the savings associated with giving examiners
additional time per application outweigh the costs of doing so. We thus
conclude that given its current level of resources, the Patent Office is
not being “rationally ignorant” but, instead, irrationally ignorant.

163. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 140, at 76–80.
164. See Peter S. Menell & Michael M. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 33–34 (2013) (describing a “wish list” of recommendations that would clarify
the claims process, such as requiring applicants to designate a default dictionary); Peter S. Menell,
Promoting Patent Claim Clarity, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (May 10, 2016), http://btlj.org/2016/
05/promoting-patent-claim-clarity [https://perma.cc/2YZQ-4J3J] (suggesting the use of a patent
claim template).
165. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 672 (arguing to limit the number of repeat
applications an applicant can file in an effort to abolish a pro-granting bias at the Patent Office);
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63
(2004) (arguing to limit the number of repeat filings).

